The University of Manchester played host to the second annual conference of the BISA US foreign policy working group on September 20th and 21st. The event, organised by Prof. Inderjeet Parmar, was larger than that of the previous year’s inaugural conference, with more than 80 registered attendees, including a large number of postgraduate students from a multitude of different institutions. The event was funded in part by BISA, and also by a generous contribution from the New Security Challenges Programme, whose Director, Stuart Croft of the University of Warwick, was in attendance. The Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) also lent vital support to the conference in the form of 35 bursaries enabling postgraduates to attend without paying a fee.

The conference took place over two days, with a total of ten panels and a roundtable on the programme. The centrepiece was a keynote address by Prof. G. John Ikenberry of Princeton, entitled ‘Liberal Leviathan’, in which he argued the case for a liberal approach to foreign policy in the face of the perceived setbacks suffered by ‘democracy promotion’ in the Middle East. The roundtable, which opened the conference, considered parallels between the wars in Iraq and Vietnam, with Craig Murphy (Wellesly), John Dumbrell (Durham), Theo Farrell (King’s), and Linda B. Miller (Brown) offering a diverse range of thoughts on the uses and drawbacks of that increasingly frequent comparison.

The panels were divided between the wars in Iraq and Vietnam, with Craig Murphy (Wellesly), John Dumbrell (Durham), Theo Farrell (King’s), and Linda B. Miller (Brown) offering a diverse range of thoughts on the uses and drawbacks of that increasingly frequent comparison.

The regional panels considered the role and policies of the United States in Asia, Latin America and Africa, and also Anglo-American relations. Other panels considered American Grand Strategy, the influence of intellectuals, the role of the military in policymaking, the significance of religion, the nature and importance of ‘soft power’, and critical approaches to the discourse surrounding the ‘war on terror’ and academic expertise in the analysis of terrorism.

At the business meeting of the working group, held on the second day of the conference, Profs Parmar and Dumbrell were warmly thanked for their work thus far in establishing the USWG as a viable entity, and for the steady increase in its size and in the scale of its conferences. It also was noted that the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR), based in the United States, had expressed interest in forming closer ties with the USWG, and it was agreed that this and other means of deepening transatlantic cooperation should be explored to their full potential. Finally, it was agreed that the large number of postgraduates in attendance at the conference was an excellent sign of vitality in the field, and that their involvement in all areas of the group’s life should be encouraged.

The next annual conference, in 2008, will be hosted by Tim Lynch at the University of London’s Institute for the Study of the Americas. The hope was universally expressed that this event would continue the successful trend of the working group’s events. In the meantime it is the group’s intention to encourage smaller conferences throughout the year under the group’s auspices. One such meeting will be held at Durham on November 16-17, hosted by John Dumbrell (see advert elsewhere in this newsletter). As the Manchester conference broke up, attendees departed encouraged that the trend in the US working group’s activities was towards an increasing scale of interest and participation.

Adam Quinn

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foreign policy, focusing on Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. My first panel was on US Grand Strategy, which addressed the Iraq War and discussed conceptualisation of American interest, threat and strategy. The discussion was lively and gave me a new perspective. The panel scheduling allowed participants a variety of choices and transitioned from one interesting topic to the next. My second panel was on The US Military and Foreign Policy, which built upon many of the ideas addressed in the Grand Strategy panel. Panels were not the only opportunity for debate and discussion: the tea breaks and panel scheduling were postgraduate-friendly. After every panel you could talk to speakers or sit down and have a nice cup of coffee to discuss research or further a dialogue from a panel.

The life of a postgraduate sometimes feels quite solitary while working in archives, libraries, and in our offices. This conference was an opportunity to meet other postgraduates. We discussed the challenges, the highs, and the lows of postgraduate life. The first day drew to a close with an informal dinner with Conference participants. The dinner with British- and US-based scholars was invaluable and it was immensely helpful to discuss the challenges of academic "life." I received advice on tutorials, book manuscripts and submissions, and surviving the dreaded viva. The dialogue was honest, funny and inclusive. I didn’t feel like a postgraduate, I felt like a colleague.

I attended three panels on the second day, Religion and US Policy, Knowledge Power and the War on Terror, and US and Africa. In one of the panels, I met a Professor whose work I am using in my own research and had the opportunity to discuss the impact of his work on mine. I left the Conference more energized and excited than when I arrived, with new colleagues, dialogues, and sound professional advice to tackle the PhD and beyond. I am certain looking forward to the next US Foreign Policy Working Group Annual Conference. See you next year!

Laura Khor

BISA Manchester Conference
Postgraduate Reflections

A PANEL IN PROGRESS.

LIVELY DISCUSSIONS OFFER NEW PERSPECTIVES.

The Argentia Editorial Team

LINDA B. MILLER • ADAM QUINN • J. SIMON ROFE

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Adam Quinn is Lecturer in International Relations at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Leicester. His most recent publications are ‘The Great Illusion: Chimeras of isolationism and realism in post-Iraq US foreign policy’, Politics & Policy, 33:3, Sep 2007 and (with Michael Cox) ‘For Better, For Worse: How America’s foreign policy became wedded to liberal universalism’, Global Society, 21:4, October 2007.

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Layout & Design by Matthew Brough
American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century, 3rd Edition - Bruce W. Jentleson

Donette Murray
Royal Military Academy Sandhurst

Writing for students is difficult. Pitch the book too high and the majority will struggle to be able to use the text in any meaningful way, pitch it too low and you run the risk of alienating those who are looking for a source that explains new and complex facts and arguments in a lucid, cogent and accessible way. It is a notoriously difficult balance to achieve but one that Bruce Jentleson has mastered in his comprehensive text book, American Foreign Policy, now in its third edition.

In seeking to explore the vagaries of contemporary US foreign policy, Jentleson opts for a simple and effective ‘multi-integrative’ approach. His ‘essence of choice’ – the means by which goals are established and the policies to achieve them are forged – utilises four key national interest criteria: Power, Peace, Prosperity and Principles, to categorise American foreign policy strategy. Having established the nature of these goals, he proceeds to introduce the concept of the ‘process of choice’. This is the making of foreign policy through institutions and amid societal influences, in other words, the role and impact of the myriad actors who inhabit the American political system (p. 13). Meshing theory with facts (the first chapter is prefaced by a useful section explaining the theories relevant to the topic), Jentleson’s framework allows him to explore key issues in American foreign policy in historical terms before turning to the substantially up-dated and expanded post Cold War era section which forms the second half of the book.

American Foreign Policy has several demonstrable strengths. To begin with, its use of large amounts of varied literature and sources (including
extracts from a range of primary material) gives it depth, credibility and colour. There is, after all, nothing quite like getting it from the horse’s mouth for connecting students with the people and events under examination. As for tutors, those already familiar with the subject will be pleased to see the inclusion of some if not all of their current favourites. Moreover, the new edition also boasts several innovative additions: a ‘Historical Perspectives’ segment designed to illustrate the continuity versus change aspect of history and politics, and an ‘International Perspectives’ section supplies students with a taste of how the US is regarded by those who are touched by its policies. One other welcome new feature, ‘Theory in the World’ highlights the connection between theory and policy – something that Professor Jentleson, by virtue of his significant governmental experience and his academic background, is superbly well placed to present yet does a first-rate job of explaining the ‘what’ in US foreign policy, the historical context rightly merits considerable attention and students are encouraged to decide for themselves the value and implications of US foreign policy, yet demonstrated does a fine job of explaining the ‘what’ in US foreign policy, the historical context rightly merits considerable attention and students are encouraged to decide for themselves the value and implications of US foreign policy, yet demonstrated does a fine job of explaining the ‘what’ in US foreign policy, the historical context.

Preventive war thinking has played a vital role in shaping US foreign policy in line with author’s approach to course. The main strength of the work is the close and consistent connections made between theory and real world events. Jentleson makes a very clear effort in this regard, drawing, as he notes, from his own experiences in the policy arena. The examples chosen are, quite frequently, extraordinarily current, which makes the text much more engaging for readers to young to remember the events on which many classic discussions of theory are based. Of course, in the strength of the book lies its weakness as well. By emphasizing the practical applications of foreign affairs theories, the theories themselves are occasionally presented as mere caricatures of themselves. As a result, the nuances that make a theoretical study of international relations entertaining and exciting are overlooked, and a certain type of reader is left unfulfilled. One mechanism designed to correct

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Roundtable Review
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this dearth of theoretical depth is the inclusion of scholarly works within the textbook itself. Most of the field's classic works are included, albeit in highly condensed versions. Morgenthau's Major Topics of World Politics, for example, is reproduced here as a short four-page essay that, once more, captures the main theoretical arguments and leaves out the subtleties.

In an effort to provide a theoretical context, Jentleson elaborates on the main variables that shape foreign policy decisions. The four “Ps” are Power, Peace, Prosperity, and Principles, and foreign policy decisions are made based on policymakers' valuations of the four distinct variables. Jentleson does an admirable job of returning to this framework consistently throughout the text, emphasizing the construct as an organizing method for students just beginning to take an in-depth look at foreign policy. While the text shifts in place, the book's first half takes a fairly typical walk through the history of American foreign policy from Independence through the Cold War. In this section there is, however, a break from the typical textbook, and that is Chapter 2's strong treatment of the domestic factors influencing foreign policy decision-making.

The dynamics of foreign policy decision-making is one of the real strengths of this work. This treatment is more inclusive than most, and is the main contribution of the work to the wide collection of foreign affairs textbooks. Jentleson recognizes five main domestic factors that shape foreign policy decision-making, and does a superb job of explaining the specific role of each factor. The dynamics of Presidential-Congressional relations—and the subsequent impact on treaty formulation and the appointment of foreign policy officials—are presented with clear examples. Jentleson also discusses politics within the Executive branch (weaving in theories of leadership and of bureaucratic functioning), the proliferation of foreign policy interest groups within the US, the effects and tendencies of the domestic news media, and the trends and currents of public opinion. Each of these factors is illustrated with practical examples. In Chapter 2 these examples are of the historical variety, whereas a similar and equally strong section in Chapter 6 provides evidence of a more contemporary nature. This focus on the domestic inputs to foreign policy formulation but also in the depth to which each factor is explored and explicated. Following the traditional tour of American foreign policy history, debates, theory, and practice over the last 225 years (certainly a difficult undertaking in thousands of pages, let alone the two hundred that Jentleson uses here), the work turns to the present and future of US foreign policy. It is here that the main strengths of the book lie.

The strongest section of the book is the discussion of “Core Policy Strategy and Foreign Policy Politics in a New Era.” This chapter takes as its starting point the attacks of 11 September 2001 and seeks to provide a foundation for the following chapters on key foreign policy issue areas. Jentleson begins with a discussion of the similarities and differences between a multilateral and unilateral foreign policy viewpoint, and does a very successful job of situating this debate in the policies of the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush presidencies. There is a brief discussion of the theoretical points of these two schools of thought, but Jentleson quickly shifts the focus to the practical application of the ideologies. Even the theoretical sections of the discussion are laced with quotations from the likes of Condoleezza Rice and Richard Haass, as well as excerpts from key foreign policy statements made by the Bush and Clinton administrations. The expected essential quotations from Mearsheimer, Krauthammer, Nye, Keohane, and the other heavy hitters are also woven into the discussion, but in such a way as to maintain a more practical, less theoretical treatment of the debate. This makes for a discussion of overarching theory that is comfortably grounded in real-world events. The choice of examples—issues such as the so-called “revolution in military affairs,” strategic nuclear deterrence, and the Bush Doctrine of preemptive military action—gives the reader an appreciation both for how the ideological wrangling between proponents of cooperation and unilateralism shapes day-to-day headlines. To be sure, for students interested in a more theoretical approach to the material, Jentleson's treatment of this key debate in American foreign policy will feel incomplete. However, as an introductory text intended for a wide range of students—from those that will go on to study International Relations or Political Science to the Biology student taking the course to better understand current events—this book does provide a useful and interesting summary of one of the foremost debates in foreign policy.

In all, that is what this text does best: provide a worthwhile summary of the theory and practice of American foreign policy that is accessible for students approaching it from many different viewpoints and interest levels. As an introductory text, then, it is certainly a success. It certainly has the capacity to start students on the road to a better understanding of and appreciation for American foreign policy—which, for an introductory text, is a very good place to start.

Response to reviews

My thanks to Argenta for organizing this colloquium on the new edition of American Foreign Policy. The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century, and to Andrew Emery, Donette Murray, Mash Pand and Christopher Forthorpe for taking the time and investing the effort to give such serious review to the book.

I especially appreciate the reviewers picking up on my motives and intentions for writing this book. While drawing on research, my own and so many others’ the book's primary purpose is for teaching. As such it reflects my—and our—passion for the subject and commitment to teaching, as Murray so nicely captures it. It also is very much an effort to “bridge the gap,” as Andrew George and others put it, to draw links between theory and policy that demonstrate how the one enhances understanding of and insights into the other.

In these and other respects I see our role as helping our students learn how to think, not telling them what to think. This can be tricky in a subject like American foreign policy. But it is the essence of the professorial responsibility, our equivalent of the old adage, “Give a man a fish, you have fed him for today. Teach a man to fish, and you have led him for a lifetime.” I would never claim that the book is totally void of my policy views, but I do try to be balanced and to provide analysis more than advocacy. In this regard I've been gratified by the range of adopters, including the U.S. Army War College on both the second edition and this third one.

In a similar way I have tried not to be parochial. This is, by definition, a book about the United States and its foreign policy, and as such is structured around America's role in the world. The key is taking this approach and having this perspective, and bringing out ways in which American foreign policy itself at times has been parochial, without lapsing into the trap oneself. The “International Perspectives” special features were added with this in mind. The reviewers did not seem to see much parochialism, but if any other colleagues do please convey it. (A recent short article, “The United States and the Solar System,” may be of interest in this regard: www.geologist.com/storyid as px?StoryId=6509.

The reviewers also address, appreciatively as well as critically, key challenges and at times trade-offs writing such a book poses. Perhaps the greatest challenge for us is to make sure students do not stand still for the life of an edition of a book. As all the reviewers acknowledge, AFP's central purpose is to provide background, framework and in-depth discussion of core issues and patterns, not fully up-to-the-minute news on this and that issue. Still strictly saying “wait till the next edition” is not a very pedagogically sound position. One way to help with this, in addition to what individual faculty provide, is through the new website we added with periodic updates on key issues presented so they track with the chapters (website is at www.wnorton.com/polisci/polisci3, it also includes sample course such as study questions and internet exercises).

The concerns Schwartz and Pant raise about whether IR theory is treated fully enough and linked clearly enough to foreign policy are well taken. The treatment is necessarily limited but it could be richer; e.g., Chapter 1 has some room for expansion. The “Theory in the World” boxes were added as another way to carry the application of theories through the book, and to help students make linkages, e.g., Kissinger and balance of power theory in Chapter 5, debates about free trade in Ch. 10. Democratic peace theory in Ch. 11.

An inherent trade-off is breadth vs. depth. It is important to include as many of the issues on the contemporary foreign policy agenda as possible, while also providing some depth of treatment. The skills of the publisher W.W. Norton help, as this book is longer than the second edition but leaner thanks to thinner pages and narrower margins. (I confess that I try to prevent my students from using similar techniques to squeeze within length limits on their papers!) Even so there are issues that do not get adequate attention. One that Professor Murray points out concerns the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Globalization chapter (10) is more developed than in prior editions but as Emery and others state, more on issues like the global environment and global public health. We also have continued to point about drugs and crime hones in on my own uncertainty about how best to address these issues.

Emery asks why there is not more on Iran, particularly in the section on economic sanctions, especially given other work I've done on the subject. The main reason was that I was in the midst of the Century Foundation study when AFP was sent off for printing. We did use the website for a Fall 2007 update and are in the process of doing so for spring 2008.

When I wrote the 1st edition, the dedication was “To my students, and those of my colleagues, with whom the choices soon will lie.” Eight years later, and taking into account that I have now been teaching for nearly 25 years (and some of you longer, some shorter), the dedication now reads, “To my students, and those of my colleagues, with whom the choices have begun to lie.” We all are in this together. Cheers.

Bruce W. Jentleson
Duke University
The interwar years saw an exponential growth behind a revolution in military strategy. Lord Curzon famously remarked, "the changing character of challenge to US oil majors. These States, as well as posing an economic threat, are also key participants in some of the most important political events of the century. The original Seven Sisters were:

- Standard Oil of New Jersey – to which ExxonMobil traces its parentage
- Standard Oil of New York – which later became Exxon and merged with Mobil in 1998
- Anglo-Persian Oil Company – which became British Petroleum (BP) in 1954 and merged with Amoco, part of the Standard Oil empire in 1988
- Standard Oil of California – which became Chevron (with US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice among its former board members) and merged with Texaco in 2001 to become Chevron Texaco
- Texaco – the first oil company to sell petrol in all US states
- Gulf Oil – which ceased to exist in 1984, after most of the company was incorporated into Chevron, a smaller part merging with BP
- Royal Dutch Shell – an Anglo-Dutch company.

These oil majors have now been consolidated into four corporations: ExxonMobil, ChevronTexaco, BP and Royal Dutch Shell. Recent trends, however, suggest they may now be losing the dominance – reflecting a shift from global north to global south which some commentators maintain is now taking place.

A Financial Times report earlier this year (Carola Hoyos, The new Seven Sisters: oil and gas giants dwarf western rivals, Financial Times, 11 March 2007) received much attention within the industry. The FT claims to have identified seven new sisters, all from outside the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Ranked by their resource base, level of output, scale of domestic market, and influence in the industry, they are in order of prominence:

1. Saudi Arabian Aramco
2. Russian Gazprom
3. Chinese CNPC, the China National Petroleum Corporation
4. Iranian NIOC, the National Iranian Oil Company
5. Venezuealan PDVSA, the majority state-owned petroleum company Petroleos de Venezuela
6. Brazilian Petrobras, or Petroleos Brasileiro meaning Brazilian Oil, a semi-public company
7. Malaysian Petronas, short for Petronella Berhad, a government-owned oil and gas company

These seven now control almost one-third of the world’s oil and gas production and more than one-third of its reserves. In contrast, ‘descendants’ of the Seven Sisters produce only around 10% of the world’s oil and gas and hold a mere 3% of reserves. Arguably, ExxonMobil is the only one of the original sisters that can still match these new market leaders. In addition, the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that 90% of new supplies over the next 40 years will come from developing countries. Hence, it may be seen that this shift in the international oil industry foreshadows some far-reaching structural changes.

In reality, the new seven are not in position today to dictate to the rest of the oil industry, with the important exception of Aramco. Their revenues lag behind those of the western majors and they continue to need assistance from the established conglomerates. Perhaps more important from the point of view of international relations, neither do they represent a unified set of interests.

Nevertheless, the new sisters are all wholly or mostly state-owned and controlled, thus putting oil reserves under the influence of governments which are relatively independent from – and in some cases, potentially hostile to – the United States. China’s economic ascendancy, making it the second biggest oil consumer, is the United States biggest single biggest competitor. Russia and Venezuela in particular are not only weighty in industry terms, their governments have the potential and perhaps the desire to play an independent role in the international political stage.

Saudi Arabia, easily the biggest and most important of the emerging giants has complex but clear ties with the US. With 25% of the world total reserves, Saudi oil dominates the market. It has three times the capacity of any other petroleum group, and in 2002 launched an expansion programme that will strengthen its position. Saudi Arabia plays the role of balancing world supply and demand by increasing its production in times of shortage. Nonetheless, it is capable of taking independent action, and might be more inclined to do so in a situation where US hegemony is in decline.

This briefest of reviews of changing circumstances indicates the potentially greater significance to energy security in US foreign policy.

Carol Turner
Doctoral Candidate
Peace Studies Department
University of Bradford
Researching Sino-US energy security relations
Comment

The Future of Anglo-American Relations: A U.S. View

The recent change in political leadership from Tony Blair to Gordon Brown provoked the predictable flurry of speculations about canine equivalents: if Blair was George Bush’s poodle, would Brown be his bulldog? More subtle suggestions about Labradors or Retrievers or even Scotties were not mentioned in the American press. No, the major pundits were generally content to focus on the different personalities of the two British leaders and to parse the body language of the Scotsman on his first official visit to Washington, as if these elements were enough to forecast the likely trajectory of U.S.-U.K. relations in the waning years of the Bush presidency. Would the use of different vocabularies underscore differences between America and Britain on the war on terror? Or on Iraq and Afghanistan?

These rather superficial readings of this particular special relationship were nothing new. Yet this approach spoke volumes about the tangled history of the once empire and its once colonial possession. The presumed role reversal over the last two centuries has been the stock in trade of numerous historians on both side of the Atlantic. Will the future resemble the past?

In charting the unknowable, i.e. the future, we must be cautious, but also sensible. Clearly, classical war will not be a factor between London and Washington, nor will a complete identity of interests prevail. Rather the relationship will ebb and flow, like all bilateral relations with Washington, subject to the political leadership, but also to the larger foreign policy agendas with their new focus on genocide and terrorism, along with the tried and true tensions of trade and defense.

Thus, in forecasting at least the near future, it issafe to assume that U.S.-U.K. relationship will remain on course, i.e. endure ups and downs, with one distinct change: the Americans have discovered once again that even a superpower needs friends, not just allies, but friends. If nothing else, the Iraq debacle has demonstrated dramatically that Britain still fulfills this requirement more adequately than any other country, in part due to language, in part due to location, and in part due to its form of government. Whatever the differences in vocabulary used to describe the contemporary world on either side of the Atlantic, whatever the tendency of U.S. policymakers or pundits to dismiss much Europe as “old”, and whatever the reflex to downgrade democracy as unimportant in the conduct of foreign policy, American political elites know that Britain as a middle rank state with both regional and global interests and ties is essential to the achievement of U.S. goals, even the most modest ones that will follow the Bush’s administration’s failed grandiosity. This is the bedrock on which the relationship rests. It is not sentimental and it is not sediment.

In more concrete terms, this means that London will exercise influence on Washington commensurate with its current status. It means that British activity in international settings like the E.U. and the U.N. will assist American aims when U.S. domestic constraints seem to push political leaders in many directions at once. Get out of Iraq, but get into Darfur? Here Britain’s measured stances and willingness to practice its diplomacy skilfully behind the scenes will count for much when Washington is blocked from effective action.

In the Middle East, Blair’s role may evolve to include actual negotiation between the Israelis and the Palestinians, though probably after Bush leaves office. More immediately, it also means that issue like poverty reduction and climate change, already part of Britain’s agenda, will assume greater importance in U.S. lists, too. In fact, London’s willingness to move away from a state-centered agenda to a more modernized one that includes networks and social movements can only have a positive effect on Washington.

What could cloud this relatively benign short-term future? Perhaps the most important determinant would be an ill-conceived attempt on the U.S. part to insist on U.K. deference to its priorities, especially on the timing of an exit from Iraq or Afghanistan. Not only would this undermine relations at the top, it could also poison mid-level contacts between American and British officialdom. It would also underscore American unwillingness to take account of British domestic public opinion which is hardly anti-American so much as anti-Bush. It could impact any positive gains in the E.U. as well.

A second factor that could cloud the relationship would be U.S. insistence on trade rules that would retain agriculture subsidies in a way that further impedes WTO guidelines. A third factor would be a lapse in Britain’s capacity to manage its relations with Europe and America at the same time. So, as always, the future is not assured.

Far more consequential will be Washington’s reorientation in 2009 and beyond. This process will succeed if U.S. policymakers realize that global shifts have already decisively undermined American claims to superiority or special status on the basis of its cold war victory. The suggestion that a “Community of Democracies”, with the U.S. and Britain in the lead is the answer to such power shifts is unlikely to be persuasive to India and Brazil, let alone to Japan and South Africa, to mention a few potential members of such a group.

Paradoxically, the U.S. could enhance its foreign policy agenda by reinventing international institutions like the U.N. or the WTO, whilst at the same time admitting that the recent over reliance on military instruments to attain its goals have backfired all over the world.

What are the chances of such a psychological transformation? Optimism about this possibility will take root as policymakers and the public accept that alternatives like the reassembly of “coalitions of the willing” have outlived their usefulness. It will take time and patience, perhaps the least obvious trait of Americans and their leaders. Nevertheless, dire circumstances often bring forth imaginative approaches. At a time when the rest of the world has moved on, including Britain, and anti-American feelings are at their highest in recorded history, the necessity of this transformation cannot be ignored or postponed. The future of Anglo-American relations will depend on it, as will the chances for a less violent world order.

Linda B. Miller
Comment

Gordon’s Game
Step back, wait and hope

The transatlantic relationship will likely be defined, from the perspective of the recently ascended British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, by the looming shadows of two elections: the 2008 presidential election in the United States, and that which Brown himself will face whenever he should opt to call it. May 2010 being the latest date permitted by law. The imperatives presented by both elections mean that an effort on Brown’s part to distance – ever so cautiously – Britain from the United States is inevitable. This will not necessarily signal a lessening of enthusiasm for Anglo-American solidarity per se, but it will. Rather it is a sign that the prime minister’s top priority – predictably – is his own electoral security, and that he is gambling on a change of personnel and attitude in Washington after 2008 to rescue things thereafter.

The keener imperative from Brown’s perspective is of course the British election, at which he craves victory to secure a mandate of his very own for government. In order to achieve this, he is keenly aware he will need to signal what in Sarkozian terminology might be called a ‘rupture’ with the Blairite brand of foreign policy associated in the public mind with subservience to the Bush administration’s whims and overzealous devotion to the doomed misadventure in Iraq. The unpopularity of this ‘poodle-zealot’ agenda, especially within the Labour Party, and what many saw as the dogmatic – perhaps even slightly unhinged – fervency with which Blair evangelised for it in his post-9/11 incantation as convert to conviction politics, went a long way towards giving transatlanticism its current tarnished name in British politics. Though by all accounts possessed of a decided soft spot for American society and political culture, with a history of regular travel to the United States and a network of contacts in US politics, Brown is compelled to react to this toxic Blairite inheritance by seeking to heal his party and shore up Labour’s standing with the coming Democratic establishment in Washington. Brown, who over the years has shown no fear of embracing his party’s tribal ties to the Democratic Party, will be well aware of this angle, and would greet a Democratic victory with no small amount of glee.

Naturally, the course of a future Brown-Clinton/Obama/Edwards relationship must have its ups and downs like any other. There are built-in features of the Anglo-American relationship which maintain it within a certain spectrum of behaviour: the interests of each as they have long defined them demand a certain cooperation regardless of leadership. Meanwhile, there will always at the same time be a constituency within British politics which kicks back against the perceived excess of influence exercised even by a mild Democratic regime in Washington. But the choices of leaders can make some difference, and Gordon Brown’s choices appear to have been made. For now, and for his own political reasons, relations must undergo a cooling to signal some reality behind his insistent rhetoric of ‘change’.

In the longer term, he is hoping that the American electorate will do its part to help him bring the relationship back to warmer climes.

Adam Quinn
Comment

Enough Already, It’s Here to Stay

Why we should stop questioning the Special Relationship

T he health of the Anglo-American special relationship is an oft-discussed topic. Pundits take its pulse whenever international crises arise, and question its longevity whenever a new president or prime minister assumes office. Its fitness is often assessed merely following the realization that the Atlantic bond had not recently been put to the test. Declarations of its demise abound. Speaking of the broader Atlantic alliance with words that ring with greater clarity for the Anglo-American relationship at its center, historian Lawrence Kaplan wrote in the early 1990s that “the idea of NATO being in a terminal state has been a topic for pundits since the 1950s.”

Certainly contemporary times do not lack for similarly dire prognoses. The recent draw-down of British troops from Iraq, even as American policymakers surged forward, prompted only the latest rash of eulogies for this unique geopolitical tie that has helped define international relations since World War II. As Geoffrey Wheatcroft opined in the New York Times, “at least one beneficial consequence of this really terrible war in Iraq would be if the pretense of the ‘special relationship’ were dropped for good.”

Enough already. The Iraq War was ill-conceived and the occupation poorly executed, and Washington would do well to follow London’s lead in departing from the ever-expanding quagmire. Yet reports of the special relationship’s demise as a result of this momentary schism or on the occasion of Tony Blair’s departure from Downing Street are worse than premature. They are also strategically wrongheaded, historically invalid, and frankly more than a tad naive. Worse yet, they force us to answer yet again the question that really should be eulogized (though not mourned): the inevitable question of the health of the Anglo-American special relationship. With full recognition that historians are perhaps the worst of all people to ask about contemporary affairs, and worse still at predictions, I contend it is time to concede its existence as a fundamental aspect of the international system for the foreseeable future. There are better questions to ponder.

The reason is simple. Leaders from the United States and the United Kingdom might not see eye-to-eye on every issue confronting the world in these difficult times, but who else might they turn to in a true crisis? Indeed, alliances are formed out of need in the first place. Today’s special relationship was born in the darkest moments of World War II. It came of age in the dangerous uncertainty of the early Cold War and survived its rebellious adolescent phase during the 1950s and 1960s (in rebellions against reason known as Suez and Vietnam). It grew to real maturity in the tumult of the post-Cold War world through cooperative diplomacy and military action including, yes, the really terrible war in Iraq. In each of these cases it was not friendship or a shared vision of the world that drew the two sides together. Even the most cursory review of the literature on Anglo-American relations composed over the last quarter-century makes clear that London and Washington disagreed on any number of critical Cold War issues. What they agreed upon was recognition of the communist threat. Given that contemporary British and American strategists perceive the same threats today, we should stop questioning the continued vitality of their special relationship. Real alliances—and the special relationship is no different on this score—are not made between friends, after all, but in opposition to shared opponents. Allies don’t even need to perceive threats in the same manner; they merely have to agree upon their identity.

If the special relationship seems less ‘special’ than it used to be, an easy explanation exists. One of the central problems for any analyst of Anglo-American relations is that its birth was also its Zenith. Decline is inevitable after such a high. The contemporary alliance began in 1940 when Hitler’s panzers and stukas seemed at their most irrepressible. Realizing that American aid offered his best hope of future victory, Winston Churchill likened the Anglo-American tie to a mighty river (the Mississippi rather than the Thames, the two overlapping real audience lays across the ocean), calling it “inexorable, irresistible, benignant.”

Americans heard his plea, especially as Churchill was not asking for American blood in late 1940, only American treasure. Thus President Franklin Roosevelt gladly gave—even if the loan carried interest—and well before the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor catalyzed Americans to war, Roosevelt’s most trusted aide told Churchill and a gathering of British policymakers to expect American support. “Thy people shall be my people,” Harry Hopkins quoted from the Book of Ruth to the anxious room, adding, an unscripted, “even to the end.”

Such is the stuff of Anglo-American legend, reflexively recalled whenever a President and a Prime Minister meet, yet we would be wise to review its particulars with a heavy dose of realism. Hopkins did not pledge solidarity with the British because, as a boy in Iowa, he’d dreamed of someday charging to the rescue of the Empire. Neither was the Roosevelt of Dutch extraction weaned with a duty to uphold the English language against all Hessian onslaughts. On the contrary, British and American policymakers talked up their mutual affection in 1940 and spawned their special relationship accordingly because they had mutual need. Britain’s peril was self-evident, while American strategists feared a German victory in Europe would force a general militarization of American society, and believed an allied victory promised greater American power and wealth. Roosevelt sided with Churchill not because they were friends (they were that), avid correspondents (they were that), or even because they shared an affinity for the cocktails from which Hitler abstained. The two nations became allies because Hitler’s Third Reich posed a danger to each.

Nineteen-forty was not so many years removed from real Anglo-American tensions. The heated transatlantic naval rivalry and economic competition of the 1920s prompted Churchill to ridicule his countrymen who thought war with the United States to be “unthinkable.” As he explained, “everyone knows this is not true.” Similarly, one ranking Foreign Office analyst concluded in 1928 that “except as a figure of speech, war is not unthinkable between the two countries.”

Such thinking coincided with American planning. Even if the likelihood of implementation was small, American strategists of the same period developed (and more importantly, repeatedly updated) their Warplan Red outlining invasion routes for Canada in case of a general conflict against the United Kingdom. Relations were not so special between the British and the Americans before World War II and the birth of their intimate alliance, in other words, that conflict appeared wholly out of the question. As the quotations above attest, it might have seemed imprudent to speak openly of Anglo-American conflict only a few years after common cause against Kaiser Wilhelm’s Germany in World War One, but such a conflict seemed far from impossible.

For the sake of time let us note that whatever real differences existed between London and Washington during the Cold War years, much as during World War II, they were simply less (by an order of magnitude) than the divide between them and the communist capitals of Moscow and Beijing. Having recently authored a book whose central thesis is that Anglo-American competition was real, vibrant, and fundamental to the special relationship over these same years, I remain convinced it is also paramount to any discussion of the Cold War to note that their quite real competition paled in comparison to the broader struggle between the capitalist and the communist worlds. As Churchill often conceded, “there is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them.” British and American Cold War planners knew this to be true. British policymakers might have felt small when pressed between the Soviet bear and the American eagle, but they knew only one of the two posed an existential threat. The Americans willingly took Britain’s markets, devalued its currency, and subsumed its ancient culture in a sea of Coca-Cola and an avalanche of Hollywood films. But American gunners did not target British cities or bases.

The same could not be said of the Soviets. Moscow’s threat to Western Europe and the Western Hemisphere was wildly exaggerated by successive
Argentina's purpose in publishing a list of those currently involved in PhD study in US foreign policy, broadly defined, is twofold. First, the promulgation of the list allows students and supervisors, to see 'who is working on what.' Second, it is hoped that such information can then be used to facilitate working relationships and collaborative projects in the future — through the convening of conference panels and the like — which will bring together established scholars and this new generation of talent.

This initial list is, no doubt, far from comprehensive. As such, the editors would welcome notification of other individual PhD students, and periodic updates on the progress of students currently undertaking PhD studies.

Andrew Emery

Title: The Carter Doctrine and US Foreign Policy in the Persian Gulf, 1979-81

My research explores the Carter Doctrine's dual effort to confront political Shi'ism in Iran and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. My work considers how perceptions of Soviet aggression influenced US policy in the region. For example, a significant military intervention would place US troops on the Afghan border and potentially push Iran into a strategic alliance with the Soviets. Sharing intelligence on Soviet troop movement with Iran, however, offered the chance for rapprochement on a basis of mutual threat. My thesis contemplates linkage between the two crises, and examines state-religious tensions established by aligning key Sunni states to confront them. Research is based on US documents from: National Archives, Carter Library; National Security Archives and interviews with contemporary policy makers. Research in Iran is planned for mid-2008.

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Department of American and Canadian Studies, University of Birmingham
Supervisor: Scott Lucas

Oz Hassan

Title: Understanding American Democracy Promotion in the Middle East: Problematising the Freedom Agenda and the Construction of the National Interest

The central focus of my research is to critically examine the social and strategic origins of the GW Bush administration's Freedom Agenda for the Middle East and North Africa. It takes September 11 2001 as a moment of disequilibrium in US-MENA relations, which has led to an alternative construction of the national interest. By constructing a crisis narrative and framing the events within American identity politics, promoting 'democracy' has become the cornerstone of US foreign and security policy in the region. Yet the institutionalisation of this policy reflects a particularly neo-liberal approach that focuses on maintaining strategic partnerships with key authoritarian allies whilst allowing for low-intensity participation from civil society.

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The Department of Political Science and International Studies
University of Birmingham
Supervisor: David Dunn

Thomas Mills

Title: U.S. Economic Planning for the Postwar World and Anglo-American Diplomacy in South America, 1940-1945

My research examines U.S. economic planning for the postwar world and Anglo-American diplomacy in South America during World War II. In particular, it considers how Britain featured in the U.S. government's wartime plans for its future economic relations with the South American republics. It seeks to ascertain if British interests in South America were seen as a threat or a hindrance to U.S. aims in South America, and what action was taken toward the British government in this respect. By examining Anglo-American economic diplomacy in this previously neglected region a more complete picture of U.S. economic plans for the postwar world as a whole can be achieved.

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Department of Politics and History
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Bevan Sewell

Title: A Global Policy in a Regional Setting: The Eisenhower Administration, Latin America and Brazil, 1953-1961

The field of US policy toward Latin America during the Eisenhower era has, in the past twenty years, split into two divergent schools of thought — the National Security school and the Economic school. Scholars from both schools have sought to identify one particular aspect of US policy — either the fight against communism or the crusade to defeat Latin American economic nationalism — as being the sole driving force behind the administration's approach. However, by examining the relationship between the strategic and economic aspects of US policy independently of each other, my thesis argues that there was an inherent tension between economic idealism and strategic pragmatism in US policy that exerted a growing influence

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How was the ‘War on Terror’ possible? In answering this question, this thesis analyses the foreign policy discourse of three countries at the forefront of the ‘War on Terror’. The United States, Britain and Australia were principal members of the ‘Coalition of the Willing’, engaging in the ‘response’ (Afghanistan), ‘internalisation’ (anti-terror legislation) and ‘transitional’ (Iraq) phases that followed the ‘void’ of 9-11. Despite numerous overlaps and borrowings, different emphases were consistently evident between the foreign policy discourse of these coalition members in ideas and themes of the ‘War on Terror’. By developing Gerard Toal’s framework to analyse foreign policy as culturally embedded discourse, this thesis argues that state leaders frame foreign policy to maximise resonance with key electoral sectors of their respective domestic populations. It is this strategic framing that accounts for differences in foreign policy discourse which International Relations has thus far failed to recognise. These differences are crucial in achieving the popular support, or acquiescence, that the ‘War on Terror’ required. jack.holland@warwick.ac.uk

University of Warwick
Supervisors: Matt McDonald & Stuart Croft

PART II explores post-Cold War US foreign policy – in particular, US exceptionalism on the framing of ‘American Grand Strategy’ during the 1990s. It uses the analytical tool of empire for understanding the evolution of US policy. Chapter nine places this ideational framework in the context of US domestic political dynamics and examines constraints on policy change that stem from domestic political factors. The concluding chapter provides a summary and a discussion of the key theoretical and policy conclusions that emerge from the research.

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SUPERVISOR: Chris Brown

Title: The Rise of the Rogue States
Doctrine: The Clinton and George W. Bush approach to National Security in the post-Cold War era

This PhD is concerned with examining the rise of the rogue states doctrine, which was articulated during the Clinton Presidency, but has become central to US foreign policy under the presidency of George W. Bush. The thesis evaluates and analyses the reasons for the development, articulation and implementation of the US approach to the rogue states and offers a comparative critique of the policy during the Clinton and Bush administrations. In addition to providing an in-depth consideration of the US approach towards states such as Iran, Iraq and North Korea, the thesis also considers the potential impact of US exceptionalism on the framing of US foreign policy. The thesis is being written up and benefits from field work in Washington, DC and interviews with key policymakers such as Anthony Lake, Daniel Benjamin, and Robert Gallucci.

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European Studies Research Institute,
University of Salford
Supervisor: Jonathan Colman

Title: Cold War Sino-US relations: potential for conflict along the Middle East, Central and East Asia energy corridor

Carol Turner

The objective of my PhD is to analyse how the current Bush administration attempted to construct new sources of international order after September 11, 2001. Simultaneously, I examine how they used their authority to redefine existing rules. Reviving the concept of change, I outline patterns of continuity and change systematically introduced by this governmental initiative to legitimise their plans of action. Theoretically, I investigate how their foreign policy justifications modified as their agency became constrained by structural and normative limitations. Focusing on the democratic discourse contained within their foreign policy, I also address the practical and ethical consequences arising from America’s undemocratic behaviour. Specifically I sketch how the concept of democracy has transformed from a refined term into a contentious issue that the Bush administration has had to defend. Consequently, I reconstruct the
The PhD List: doctors in the area of US foreign policy presently in progress...

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legitimization of ‘democracy’ as a form of socio-political statecraft. Rather than presuming this blueprint to be purely advantageous, I posit that it overlooks the contextual specificity and ideational dimensions of democracies. Furthermore, such accounts omit how the glaring gap between America’s words and deeds has created alternative interpretations of its current foreign policy objectives. Seeking to overcome such limitations I adopt a constructivist framework to highlight the centrality of inter-subjective rules. The inextricable links between recognition and legitimacy are also explored.

Department of International Relations, St. Andrews University
Supervisor: Karin Fiehle

TOM HAYES
Title: Balancing Power, U.S. foreign policy, 1898-1921

The thesis will test the hypothesis that the United States was primarily concerned with the problem of national security, which successive administrations in the period between 1898 and 1921 viewed as dependent upon a favourable balance of power; in other words, the United States (U.S.) was only motivated to act in world politics when its security was perceived to be threatened directly or indirectly, when its preferred balance of power was adversely changed. Decision-makers in the executive identified the interests to be defended and determined whether they were secure (whether the distribution of power of which they approved was being modified, producing a configuration that was unbalanced and/or favourable to nations hostile to the U.S.). The hypothesis will be tested against the history of U.S. foreign policy between 1898 and 1921, but especially certain episodes of U.S. foreign policy in this period.

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Dept. of International Relations, London School of Economics
Supervisor: Michael Cox

CATALINA MONToya LONDONO
Title: Framing event-driven news in the Colombian war. The promotion of the U.S. agenda in the pages of 'El Tiempo' newspaper

This research tests how event-driven news have affected the United States' promotion of their foreign policy with regards to the Colombian conflict in the pages of the most important national newspaper, 'El Tiempo'.

Moreover, I explore possible differences in the reporting of different categories of event-driven news. This will advance both to our understanding of the ability of event-driven news events to boost news media autonomy, and to the Colombian public sphere.

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University of Manchester
Supervisor: Piers Robinson

PATRICIA SHAMAI
Title: Exploring the Concepts Behind the Definition: Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

The purpose of this thesis is to unravel the concepts behind the definition ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’. The thesis goes about by examining the conceptual discussions and historical context within which the definition has emerged. The thesis addresses what is important by this definition? Why it was created and whether the term is still relevant. In exploring why these weapons are categorically distinct from other conventional weapons; this research examines the historical, political, normative and technological factors behind the creation of the term and examines these within the context of existing IR theories such as realism, constructivism and strategic culture, finally, questioning whether the term is still relevant in relation to current security threats. The thesis is predominantly based upon American strategic policy making and much of the analysis and information has been provided from US sources and by an examination of historical transcripts of important arms control agreements.

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Southampton University
Supervisor: Darryl Howlett

JENNY NIELSEN
Title: The role of the nuclear non-proliferation regime in U.S. nuclear policies vis-a-vis Iran (1969-2005)

The purpose of my study will be to investigate, what the role of the international system in the creation of the European Foreign Policy is. The European Union has come a long way advancing its cooperation in the field of foreign relations, increasingly aspiring to be an important and effective actor on the world scene. My project will answer the following question: what is the influence of the US foreign policy on the formation of the European Foreign Policy? For this study, the influence of American foreign policy, as one important indicator, on the behaviour of the EU institutions and Member States, will analysed. To explore this topic, a thorough analysis of the current US foreign policy is necessary.

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University of Southampton
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KAMIL ZWOJSKI
Title: ‘The influence of the US foreign policy on the formation of EU foreign policy

The purpose of my study will be to investigate, what the role of the international system in the creation of the European Foreign Policy is. The European Union has come a long way advancing its cooperation in the field of foreign relations, increasingly aspiring to be an important and effective actor on the world scene. My project will answer the following question: what is the influence of the US foreign policy on the formation of the European Foreign Policy? For this study, the influence of American foreign policy, as one important indicator, on the behaviour of the EU institutions and Member States, will analysed. To explore this topic, a thorough analysis of the current US foreign policy is necessary.

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GEORGE KHELASHVILI
Title: US foreign policy towards Georgia since September 2001

Abstract: Among many interesting questions regarding American involvement in the post-Soviet space, one that captures attention is what caused the major US commitment to a small, hitherto little known nation with almost no natural resources and major geopolitical significance, while this commitment could and did jeopardize America’s relations with far more important strategic counterpart – Russia. Finding answers to this question is even more exciting given the relative absence of any clear-cut explanation – whether by international systemic, domestic political, economic, historical, ideological factors or some historically contingent defining event. Despite a vast variety of possible explanations and classes of explanatory variables, I would like to concentrate on American policy makers’ perceptions of where Georgia fits into the pattern of their policies in the post-Soviet space, as they have seen this pattern.

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Supervisor: S. Neil MacFarlane

T.S. SOWERS
(CAPTAIN, SPECIAL FORCES, INSTRUCTOR OF AMERICAN POLITICS, UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY)
Title: Nanomanagement: The Organizational Challenge of Monitoring in the 21st Century

How has the dramatic increase of monitoring technologies influenced the ability of America’s bureaucracies to implement policy? No longer dependent on costly internal police patrols or external and uncontrolled fire alarms, far removed principals can now monitor their agents at home and abroad (and their subagents) with unparalleled consistency and precision. Employing a principal agent framework, this study analyzes the impact of the explosion of technology enabled monitoring (live video feeds, GPS tracking, email) and its impact on efficiency, professions and the traditional hierarchical structures. If everyone rushes to the sound of the guns, who is planning for what happens when the guns go silent? This study analyzes cases of the military, the Department of Homeland Security and crisis response to explore the benefits and costs of hypermonitoring and nanomanagement.

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Supervisor: Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey

MOHAMMED SHAREEF
Title: Distinctives and Dependencies in George W. Bush’s US Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East.

My topic of research broadly speaking is “US foreign policy towards the Middle East”, with Iraq as the case study. The study covers the George W. Bush presidency (both terms), aiming to identify, the changes (major or minor departures) and continuation (consistency or divergence) in US foreign policy towards the Middle East during that period. It is also my interest to research possible US changes in attitude to this region, which are mostly attributed to specific schools of thought. The research therefore, will also pay great attention to the intellectual and policy roots of contemporary US foreign policy towards that region.

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Alexander Bristow

Title: The role of the United States in changes to Japanese security policy since the end of the Cold War

The changes Japan has made to its security policy have been viewed by some commentators as ‘reluctant realism’, forced upon Japan by the necessity of retaining a strong U.S.-Japan alliance. I explore the hypothesis that, rather than being purely reactionary measures, U.S. pressure gave influential Japanese policy elites the opportunity to implement changes that they already had a preference for. The political discourse in Japan frequently uses the term ‘beiatsu’, which means U.S. pressure. I intend to study whether Japanese policy elites use beiatsu in foreign policy in the same manner as they use ‘gaiatsu’ (outside pressure) in domestic policy: displacing the political costs of advocating changes unpopular with public opinion or bureaucratic inertia onto an outside agent. I hope that the results of my research will challenge whether the rationalist assumptions made in power politics models of international relations and alliance theory have unique characteristics when applied to Japanese foreign policymaking.

Nicholas Kerton-Johnson

Title: The Justifications for and Practice of US Military Intervention: An English School Analysis of the Use of Force in International Society

The aim of this thesis is to critically analyze the nature of US military intervention through an exploration of the presidential justifications for and practice of intervention by the US. It does this by analyzing two cases prior to, and two cases post, 9/11 in order to shed light on continuity or change in military intervention. The cases are: the Gulf War, Kosovo Campaign, Afghanistan War and Iraq War. The analysis is located within an English School frame of reference, through which it evaluates the solidarist and pluralist contentions regarding the nature of international society. It considers the creation, devaluation and constraining powers of norms within this society.

Neil McKintrick

Title: Going to War. The decision to intervene in Iraq (2003)
The war in Iraq has proved the defining decision of a Presidency and a three term Prime Minister. The decision, controversial at the time, has been further questioned with the subsequent failures in the reconstruction of Iraq. This study aims to look at the decision making process that lead to the intervention and the true motivation behind the military campaign based in three competing hypotheses. 1)The decision to go to war was made on the basis of it being a humanitarian intervention. 2)The decision to go to war was out of the self interest of the US/UK; 3)The decision to go to war was in line with international law. Supporting each hypothesis will be an IR theory. (Idealism, Realism and International Law) to explain how the decision was made and the context in which it was framed. In uncovering the motivation behind the war an insight will be gained into the decision making process and create an understanding of the rationale of the most debated intervention since Vietnam.

Liat Radcliffe Ross

Title: Muslim Foreign Policy Lobbies in Britain, Canada and the United States

Speculation about the foreign policy opinions and political impact of Muslims living in the West seems to be growing. This thesis will assess the contention that Muslims in the West share foreign policy interests. Specifically, this hypothesis will be examined by looking at the foreign policy preferences and activities of leading Muslim pressure groups operating in three Western pluralist democracies: Britain, Canada and the United States.

Nick Boucic

Title: Democracy assistance and promotion and the pursuit of U.S. foreign policy goals

The United States is the focus of the most intense attention in research on democracy assistance and promotion (DAP). Claiming the spread of democracy is a panacea for international peace and prosperity as well as crucial for its national interest, it is now the largest state actor in this field through state agencies such as USAID and the funding of independent institutions. The study of U.S. DAP has focused mostly on whether the U.S. really wants to promote democracy or even the right kind of democracy, whether it can do so, and whether it benefits from doing so first. But even little attention has been paid to the fact that if DAP is an instrument of foreign policy. Its effectiveness should be judged not only on whether it leads to more democracy, but also on whether it delivers progress in areas of foreign policy that are key to the U.S. national interest. It is important, therefore, to investigate whether U.S. DAP supports some of its fundamental foreign policy goals.

Robert Jones

Title: The Bush Administration: Continuity or Discontinuity in American Foreign Policy?

A neoclassical realist analysis of the Bush doctrine, drawing on historical parallels to illustrate a broad continuity with traditional American foreign policy.

Imad El-Ans

Title: An Assessment of the Political Economy of Trade Between the United States of America and Jordan

The thesis examines the contemporary nature of trade relations between the US and Jordan using a Liberal Institutionalist approach and tests the hypothesis that freer trade will lead to greater economic integration and further political interdependence and cooperation. The historical evolution of US-Jordan relations is considered along with an analysis of US foreign and trade policy towards the Middle East and North Africa region since 2000. An analysis of the dual processes of economic and political reform in Jordan as well as foreign and trade policy is also presented. Combined, these lead to an explanation of the facilitating legal framework of trade between the two states. An analysis of market forces is then presented in three sectors - textiles and clothing (low-value, low-technology manufacturing), pharmaceuticals (high-value, high-technology manufacturing) and insurance and banking (financial services) - to determine how private actors are shaping economic relations between the two states.

Jasmine Gani

Title: US-Syrian hostility and collaboration in the Middle East

The thesis examines the consistency and longevity of US-Syrian hostility; a distinctive case in the context of the region’s dynamic political landscape. It focuses on four case-studies of dispute since the Bush doctrine: Syria’s involvement in Lebanon; Syria’s support for Hizbollah and Hamas; Syria’s support for Iran after the Islamist revolution in 1979 and during the Iran-Iraq War; and Syrian opposition to the United States on terrorism and invasion of Iraq, 2003. In analysing the causes and constituents of US-Syrian hostility, the thesis challenges the prevailing realist explanations of Syrian foreign policy and argues that Syria’s position towards the US is primarily motivated by its pan-Arab ideology and beliefs. The thesis charts the ideologisation of Syrian politics and hostility towards the US, assessing the roles of Syria’s colonised past, US interventionism in the region, the structure of the Syrian regime, and finally its connection to public opinion and the mass media.

Department of International Relations, London School of Economics, Supervisor: Fred Halliday

Er-Wen Tan

Title: Comparing realist and constructivist approaches to the US-North Korean security dilemma.

My research begins by addressing the question of whether the security dilemma and its mitigation. I focus my research on four theoretical approaches to the security dilemma: offensive realism, defensive realism, Wendtian constructivism and critical poststructuralism, and their implications for the process of mitigation of security competition between states seeking to safeguard their security. I adopt these four theoretical perspectives for the purpose of empirical analysis of the process of US-North Korean interaction from 1993 to the present, from there drawing out an understanding of what works, and what doesn’t work, in reducing security competition between states.

Department of International Relations, University of Wales Aberystwyth, Supervisors: Nicholas J Wheeler & Graeme A Davies

Geraldino Nagib Zahiran Filho

Title: The US Liberal Tradition and the Framing of the World Order

The thesis addresses US foreign policy for international institutions in the post-World War II and post-Cold War environments. Engaging previous IR theories regarding great powers and the creation of international orders, it offers a complementary explanation about why the US opted for institutions that had embedded into them liberal political values. The hypothesis recalls the concept of a US liberal tradition articulated by consensus historians in the 1930s. It expresses the inexistence of a conservative tradition in US politics and a widespread belief in a set of shared liberal principles and values. The US liberal tradition would play a decisive role in shaping US policies, accounting for the liberal character of contemporary international institutions.

The PhD List: doctorates in the area of US foreign policy presently in progress...
Why we should stop questioning the Special Relationship

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American administrations, but as the ever-pithy Churchill warned, Britain was "perhaps the bull's-eyed" of any future Soviet attack. Yet today, the Anglo-American alliance, conversely, stopped updating their War plan Red in 1939. Thereafter there was no need to game an attack against Canada or British interests, because there were bigger fish (or in this case, bears) to fry. As one ranking American policymaker conceded in January of 1952—on the occasion of Churchill's historic first visit to Washington following his return to office—anticommunism was the order of the day, and 'the UK is the one country outside of France (which we are directly supporting in Indochina) that plays an important military role outside its own immediate geographic need" in countering communism's advance. Even Rome had allies and vassals after all, and "we depend" on the British, he continued, "to carry out military responsibilities that are vital to our whole security position" against communist incursions.10 Whatever their real differences, British and American policymakers knew who to fear, and conversely who to trust.

The contemporary world is no different. British or American planners see the same threats when they survey the globe in its present form. Both agonize about a renewed Russian threat, both fear that tensions in the Taiwan Strait might erupt in a spasm of violence, and of course they both fear international terrorism. Even if the ballooning threat assessments that marked the Cold War appear re-born in overstates of Al Qaeda's abilities, the harsh fact remains that 9/11 and its aftermath has undermined America's standing even among its closest allies. London and Washington has become a difficult relationship for the future.The Anglo-American special relationship is "truly a remarkable one," as the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, William Hague, once put it. The reason is simple: the Anglo-American standing is too great to be abrogated. As the Prime Minister of India explained to a gathering of British and American strategists just last week, "the Anglo-American special relationship has been the lifeblood of British foreign and security policy for more than 70 years. It goes back to the Cold War, and it will go on for as long as we want to keep it going."


FOOTNOTES
3 This moment is oft-told, by historians and politicians alike. Tony Blair told the tale at a White House state dinner held on February 5, 1998. For a particularly well told rendition, see Dorns Keirns Goodwin, No Ordinary Time (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 211.
4 As my colleague J. Simon Bevec accurately noted in his companion essay to this piece, published in Passport, Britain's Ambassador in Washington (Lord Lothian) pressed home the virtues of an Anglo-American alliance not on cultural or political grounds but because joint action against fascism was in Washington's own strategic interest.
6 Ibid.
10 Engel, p. 129.

Call for Submissions

Argentia welcomes submissions from its readership for any section of the newsletter. If you would like to contribute a comment piece, participate in a book review forum (or submit a title for review), advertise an event, or suggest any other item for publication, please make contact with the editors. We are keen to hear from you. General reader feedback on Argentia – positive or negative – is also welcome.

Libertas

www.libertas.bham.ac.uk is dedicated to engagement with and interrogation of US foreign policy past, present, and future. We seek not only to study US policymaking but to explore the relationship between the American state and its foreign. From weekly analyses to essays on conferences and seminars to participation in our discussion board.


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