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May 7 2009
The World Bank: Becoming the World's Economic Good Guys?
Ali Yenidunya, University of Birmingham

On 26 April, Robert Zoellick, the head of the World Bank, told a news conference,  that poor countries are paying a heavy price in the deepening global economic crisis. According to Zoellick:

- In 2008 more than 50 million people, most of whom are children and women, fell under the threshold of extreme poverty, measured as earnings of $1.25 a day.

- Most of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals could not be met because of the economic crisis.

- In 2009, between 55 and 90 million more people will fall into extreme poverty. The number of those suffering chronic hunger will pass 1 billion.

US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner added on the same day: “The global economic crisis threatens to reverse gains in fighting poverty.” So, in contrast to earlier crises, governments of developed countries are warning that the situation behind the poverty curtain is getting worse, with irrecoverable effects in these regions unless there are urgent interventions.

To meet this challenge, Zoellick suggested that those countries who promised to donate funds should fulfil their promises soon, increasing their contributions where possible. New employment opportunities should be created to advance global economic growth, with new investment projects of $55 billion in Africa.

For Geithner, investment banks working with the World Bank should be more transparent in their assistance. They should direct investment effectively to fulfil long-term development goals and address poverty. The International Monetary Fund should ensure more representation of developing countries.

The troubling question lurks, "What if these measures are not taken?" For Zoellick, if the current crisis is not ameliorated, there will be a humanitarian disaster in poor countries: "There is a widespread recognition that the world faces an unprecedented economic crisis, poor people could suffer the most and that we must continue to act in real time to prevent a human catastrophe."

These steps are not marginal; there is a sense of concern for the most deprived when the global economy is likely to shrink by 1.3 percent this year. Still, I wonder whether the descendants of today's 'conscientious' problem-solving guys will have enough concern and courage to criticize the cyclical dynamics of global capitalism when, after an upturn, there is again the possibility of maximising profits.

April 23
Israel-Palestine: The Political Wreck on Netanyahu's Track
Ali Yenidunya, University of Birmingham

A month ago, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu opened a conference in Jerusalem. In contrast to other high-profile meetings such as that last week with US envoy George Mitchell and in May or June with President Obama, this was a quiet affair. However, the Jerusalem Wealth Management Conference, featuring Netanyahu’s participation, was far from insignificant.

The conference’s concern was difficulties with investments in Palestine and Israel, both for individuals and for companies. Amongst those considering the matter were the Bank of Israel, the Ministry of Trade, the International Monetary Fund, the Association of Banks in Palestine, the US Embassy in Israel, the new Israel-Palestine Chamber of Commerce, and the PalTel (Palestinian Telecommunications) Group. Discussions were in three main panels: Israeli Inc. as a Grade A Destination, Israel's Investment Opportunities, and Investment in the Palestinian Economy.

This, however, was a conference with political as well as economic significance. It was no less than a forum for Prime Minister Netanyahu’s strategy towards the Israeli relationship with Palestine. In his commitment to “economic peace initiatives”, he was also drawing the line against a political two-state resolution. Netanyahu was once again declaring that peace talks could focus on building the Palestinian economy and its governing institutions, but there was no need for them to engage other issues such as settlements, refugees, the status of Jerusalem, and borders.

While there is no record to dissent from the gathered bankers, financiers, and investors to Netanyahu, the weakness --- possibly even the folly --- of his approach was clear. A progressive peace plan cannot be achievable merely through “investment”, strengthening the Palestinian economy and the economic relationship between Israel and the West Bank.

Economics might be the fundamental for a Marxist approach, determining the political superstructure in and between societies. It might underpin the McDonalds theory of Economic Liberalism bringing political change. It does not, however, work in the Israeli-Palestinian case.

Economics cannot deal with a Hamas organization which claims that it is the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and which has been successful in convincing many of those people, not only since its 2006 election victory in Gaza but also, amidst Operation Cast Lead, in the West Bank. Economics cannot make Hamas move its feet faster in negotiations with Fatah for a unity government or raise its voice for the principles of the US-EU-Russia-UN Quartet: the recognition of Israel, denunciation of the armed struggle, and adherence to the agreements signed by the Palestinian Authority.

Nor can economics fit Israel’s attempt to alienate Hamas with a “Divide & Rule” strategy, effectively removing Gaza from consideration. Indeed, the strengthening of the economic structures of the West Bank will complicate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by adding problems such as the widening gap of incomes between Gazans and inhabitants of the West Bank and possible corruption amongst Palestinian officials. Nor will West Bank prosperity go unchallenged by Hamas, which will seek to undermine any advances that do not benefit Gaza as well.

Far from bolstering his prospective ally in negotiations, Netanyahu’s statement has alienated Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas. Until the formation of the Netanyahu coalition, which occurred just after the Jerusalem conference, Abbas was making no complaints. However, as soon as the new Foreign Minister, Avigdor Lieberman, made clear --- in blunter terms than those of his Prime Minister --- that Israel would not follow the 2007 Annapolis process for a two-state resolution, followed by Netanyahu’s explicit preference for an economic track over a political one, Abbas came out in opposition to Tel Aviv’s plans: “The Palestinian issue is not an economic problem. This is, first and foremost, a political case.”

Even if Abbas is in a relatively weak position, compared to the new Israeli Government, his shift runs Netanyahu’s economic strategy into a cul-de-sac. The Obama Administration, in return for its political investment in an Israeli-Palestinian (and wider regional) solutions, will expect concessions from each side. Netanyahu, with his priority on economic discussions, is effectively trying to rule out any such concession on his part.

Washington may get some short-term benefit from a newly-opened plant or (as occurred two weeks ago) a “security center” in Jericho, but these will not be sufficient as the year moves on. Success in its “attack on crisis”, as well as its War on Terror which is not called a War on Terror, demands a public breakthrough on the Israeli-Palestinian political deadlock. Otherwise, the only winner will be the outsider, Hamas, who will feast on any setback for Abbas as well as Obama.

So, after this Jerusalem Wealth Management Conference, we should be watching not for the warm handshake from the US investor but the poke in Netanyahu’s chest from the Obama representative. “Engagement” demands some acceptance from the Israeli Prime Minister of a political track rather than an economic one because --- here is the paradox --- Tel Aviv cannot sustain economic development without the co-operation of the US Government.

February 9
A Sensible Consideration of "Islamist Terrorist"
Maren Schroeder

The British media continue to highlight the imminent danger of Islamic terrorists lurking within. This weekend, for example, The Daily Telegraph proclaimed, "Barack Obama has been warned by the CIA that British Islamist extremists are the greatest threat to US homeland security. .

So, amidst the headlines of fear, how great is the peril?

According to Europol’s 2008 EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, less than one percent of all terror acts reported in Europe in 2007 were connected to Islamist terrorism. While the outcome of even a single successful attack, as in Madrid in 2004 or London in 2005, s horrifying, the actual risk of being a victim of Islamist attacks is infinitesimal.

In 2007, Europol received reports of 583 foiled, failed or successful terror attacks; of those, only four were committed by Islamist terror groups, none succeeded. Despite this minimal prevalence, Islamist terrorism is diligently persecuted. More than 25 percent of arrests for crimes connected to terrorist activities are linked to Islamist terror groups. This percentage would rise further were UK figures included:

As in 2006, the vast majority of the arrested suspects in the UK were in relation to Islamist terrorism. However, since these arrests were not reported as affiliated to any type of terrorism, they were not included in the statistics. For 2007, the arrests in the UK increased by 30 percent.

The disparity between Islamist attacks and arrests could be due to a disproportionate focus on Islamist terror or an as yet unreported number of current investigations into new plots. Still, the unique nature and origin of Islamist terrorism results in tough challenges for the law enforcement agencies and the intelligence community.

Right- and left-wing terror groups aim to change society towards their extremist models. Single-issue terrorism seeks to change just one aspect of society, such as environmental practices. Ethno-national and separatist terror groups want international recognition and self-determination. Attacks are planned to ensure the survival of the attacker; members are considered valuable, skilled assets to the group, sometimes training for years. As a result of members’ close cultural and social ties to their country, infiltrating these groups and predicting their targets is possible; intelligence about them is attainable.

Islamist terror groups are different: infiltrating them is impossible for a non-Muslim agent, severely limiting the number of operatives available. The preferred delivery method is the suicide attack, often carried out after minimal training, ensuring quick availability of new extremists. Destruction of the target state and the establishment of a new Muslim world order are generally declared to be their aims.

Counter-terrorism measures, therefore, include arresting not just suspected Islamist terrorists but their entire support network --- political, ideological and financial backers are all targeted. This leads to a comparatively high number of people taken into custody, often not linked to an actual threat. As a consequence, according to the Europol report,  “Court proceedings in relation to Islamist terrorism have the highest acquittal rate: 31 percent of the defendants were found not guilty.”

Unsurprisingly, data collection is inconsistent. Amonst Europol states, reporting countries have their own definition of terrorism; attacks arising from extremism of any ilk are not included in the figures, as what constitutes extremism and what terrorism is a national decision. Right-wing extremism in Germany, for instance, is traditionally over-reported, but Austria and France, who exhibit a much higher tolerance towards right-wing groups in general, under-report it. Spain, frequently targeted by separatist terror group ETA , includes arson attacks on often empty buildings as terror attacks. The UK only reported two attacks altogether: the failed car bombs in London and the attack on Glasgow airport, omitting the cars blown up by animal rights activists.

One final, far from insignificant point. The report’s trend analysis states that “[t]he conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have a large impact on the security environment of the EU”. The threat of Islamist Terrorism is real, but it is neither as prolific nor as inevitable as politicians and journalists alike seem to insist. A more productive emphasis, indeed a necessary first step is  an acknowledgement that foreign policy on EU and national level could cause retaliatory terror attacks in Europe. It is in a less belligerent approach to certain Muslim countries that the risk of suicide attacks can be decreased.

January 21
A Tale of Two Inaugurations
David Dunn, University of Birmingham  

October 1
America and Disability: The Sin of Omission
John Matlin, University of Birmingham  

As my wife and I spent most of September touring northern California and Oregon, I though that with sights like Yosemite, Crater Lake and The Avenue of Giants, it is little wonder that some Americans believe they live in God’s country.

That view must have been tested during Hurricane Ike. Yet we saw the best of American spirit as the inhabitants of Galveston , Texas , shared precious water and food with the volunteers who came to help. It was a generosity that I witnessed when I was in New York on 11 September 2001. In the immediate aftermath of the attack on the World Trade Center , our hotel on 54th and 6th was home to many out-of-state firemen who worked 24-hour shifts and came to the hotel to sleep before returning to clean up the site.

However, Americans can exhibit a flip side, namely their attitude to physical disability. On my first trip to America , some forty years ago, I saw Manhattan from the Jersey shore, I watched the foundations being laid for the World Trade Centre, and I discovered that the word “funky” was useful for all kinds of situations. But nobody could offer an explanation for a simple question. Why were all American dollar bills the same size and colour? How would a blind person distinguish between a Washington ($1) and a Franklin ($100) and denominations in between? Today, nothing has changed, even if a difference in size of notes or Braille under the picture would solve the problem.

There seems to be something in the American psyche about desiring and seeking physical perfection. Just watch the plethora of US television advertisements for products which will make one look “better”: i.e., slimmer, younger, fitter, healthier. The medication alone which appears in advertisements could stock a large pharmacy. Meanwhile, West Coast news television channels offer “Barbies”, young, pretty, white, blonde presenters who squeak through pinched nasal passages and whose reporting skills are limited. Their male counterparts are inclined to be older but generally handsome with flashing eyes.

Form over content, sound bites over analysis. It is not a phenomenon limited to television. Take a look at the politicians. Barack Obama chose a running mate who could play Cary Grant, at the same time ignoring the likes of Barney Frank. Frank is a former university professor and US Congressman since 1981 who is chairman of the influential House Financial Services Committee. He is also an overweight, balding man who speaks with a broad Boston accent. Clearly he is not visual vice-presidential material.

The concentration on image would be funny if it did not have such serious implications. The Beijing Paralympic Games took place during our trip, but most Americans probably never knew. I did not see one television item on the Paralympics, whether on daily news programmes or on the numerous sports channels. I read a local newspaper most days, but only one mention was made in the Sports Results Section of The Oregonian, noting a gold medal had been won by an American.

Let me contrast the treatment of the Paralympics in Sydney in 2000 with Atlanta in 1996. I was in Sydney for the Olympics. Although my schedule did not allow me to wait there another three weeks for the start of the Paralympics, there was no difficulty finding out about the forthcoming event. As I travelled around Australia , every night on television news there were reports of torch ceremonies and items on competitors and their families. The splendid opening and closing ceremonies were shown in full on network television, and coverage of the Games themselves was extensive. Australia celebrated the triumph of achievement over physical handicap.

In Atlanta , the Paralympics were treated as an embarrassment. Facilities, such as wheelchair ramps, were not available. The Olympic Village itself was reduced in size as units were occupied by locals. Most insulting of all, the flags of competing nations, clearly visible during the “proper” Olympics, were removed and only replaced after vigorous protest. The treatment of Paralympians in Atlanta was so bad that the International Olympic Committee, which awards the Games, tightened its rules considerably for both Athens and London . In Sydney , such action was unnecessary.

In a country where evangelism is important to many people, why do the American media turn their back on persons who are physically handicapped when they compete in athletic endeavour? Is there still a belief that God’s wrath is visited on their people in the form of disability? Surely, the disabled athletes should be feted and celebrated, but either the media is leading the censorship of achievement or is led by the perception that American viewers, listeners and readers do not want such reporting. I cannot tell which is the true reason for neglect, but either way, I feel the need to reply to America : Shame on you.

September 18
How Effective is the Palin Effect?
John Matlin, University of Birmingham  

American presidential politics is nothing if not gladiatorial. It is even Darwinian in terms of survival of the fittest in a two-year battle for victory. It is also often predictable: when “the latest thing” arrives on the scene, the American media feasts upon it, first like epicures but eventually like vultures. On the West Coast, where I have been the last fortnight, the Republican nominee for Vice President, Sarah Palin, has dominated the political news media at the expense of all other candidates. The question is: will that dominance push John McCain to victory or finally doom his campaign?

By her admission, Palin is a pit bull, albeit with lipstick. Swept up by her aggression, the Republican base warmed immediately to this gun-toting, pro-life Hockey Mom. From the “get go”, as they say over here, she laid out her stall as a Republican through and through, someone who the party could trust to preserve the values of Reagan and George W. Bush and who would lambast the Democratic opponents.  Unlike her new boss, she had no history of flip-flops over important Republican base issues, such as creationism. Furthermore, she had the important attribute of “experience” of life outside the beltway.

It is emerging that “experience”, in Palin’s case, means a short-lived career as a presenter of television programmes town councilor in Wasilla , Alaska , before election as mayor and then state governor. Yet, with the presentation of this record, it is as if George Orwell has been writing the script of 1984 in 2008. According to Republican commentators, Palin has life experience while all Joe Biden, the Democratic nominee for Vice President, knows is how to legislate; so much for 38 years as a Congressman and chair of influential Senate committees, such as Judiciary and Foreign Relations. Furthermore, the Republicans considered it appropriate to “manage” Palin’s press interviews until the media have learned to treat her with “respect and deference”. Palin good, First Amendment rights bad. Hopefully, the attempts of McCain’s campaign manager to manage the rules of the televised Vice Presidential debate will not end in apoplexy

Satirists are beginning to have a field day at the Republicans’ expense. When challenged about his affluent lifestyle and, in particular, the several houses at his disposal courtesy of his wealthy wife, McCain resorted to the non sequitur that he spent five years in Vietnam as a prisoner of war. Palin’s recent interview on the ABC television network  produced huge guffaws when she was unable to recite the Bush Doctrine. “Never mind”, said Jon Stewart, “nor can Bush

Is the Palin Effect starting to wear off? The trouble about being “the latest thing” in a faddist society is that fads fade quickly. There are seven weeks to go until the election and soon the Democrats will focus their attack, in general on the fitness of Republicans to run a failing financial sector and the US economy, in particular on the fitness of a forty-something inexperienced Alaskan to take on the leadership of the country, should John McCain die or leave office.

Common sense dictates that Democrats will win in November but when did common sense ever determine the results of an election?  Perhaps the saddest indictment of the electoral system was voiced to me by a Coast Guard veteran, who said that he ought to vote Republican because of that party’s support of the services and McCain’s war record but that his head told him Obama was the right person to lead. However, he added, it makes little difference because if the Republicans are within ten percent of victory on election-day, they will steal the votes they need. This was not just his opinion, he told me, but the concerns of many with whom he served. I can only cling to the hope that, on Election Day, he will be proved wrong.

September 2
Scrambling for Energy: 
The Important Story Hidden by the "New" Cold War
Atticus Finch, University of Birmingham

Well, it’s been another few days of what my daddy calls fussin’ and faffin’ over the Russian-Georgian conflict. The headline gathering was the emergency summit of the European Union. Predictably, given the domestic politics and the realities of the situation vis-à-vis Moscow , a couple of leaders (Brown of Britain, Sarkozy of France) were allowed to blow hot smoke. Then the EU put out a rather cautious warning of “strategic realignment” if Russia didn’t change its behaviour, supported by token suspensions of talks on trade and energy co-operation. Equally predictably, most in the British and American press blew even hotter smoke about “weak-willed”, “lily-livered” Europe .

(The unexciting reality --- unexciting because it doesn’t live up to the billing of New Cold War --- is that Europe and Russia, with the US Government watching on the side, are manoeuvring for an agreement in which international forces will go into the buffer zone between Russia and Georgia. Where exactly that buffer zone starts and ends and who will be in the international force, rather than the posturing over NATO alignments and missile defence, will be the key questions in weeks ahead.)

Meanwhile, a more intriguing struggle is unfolding. For those preferring the good v. evil storyline, the Russians are involved but so are a lot of other folks:

1). The Financial Times reports from Turkey that a section of the BTC pipeline was damaged by an explosion the day before the Russian-Georgian conflict erupted over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Kurdish separatists claim responsibility for the explosion, which temporarily bottlenecked and then stopped the flow of both oil and natural gas.
 
2) The east-west railroad tracks of Georgia were put out of action with the demolition of a railroad bridge near Gori after Russian troops came through the tunnel connecting Ossetia to Georgia . Simultaneously the Russian Navy blockaded the approaches to the port town of Poti and then landed assault troops to secure the oil terminal. 
 
3) British Petroleum shut down their Azeri operations (primarily natural gas) at Supsa. Their spokesman acknowledged that the Russians impeded their operations and that the Kurds had physically damaged their transshipments by bombing the BTC pipeline. While the BTC is again open, BP has not reopened its Supsa operations. Basically Russia has scared the Caspian republics out of transiting their oil and natural gas through the Caucasus .

4)  Kazakhstan, which had been developing the Tengiz crude oil export terminal that they own and operate at the Georgian port of Batumi , isn ow indicating that it would "prefer to export its oil through Russian pipelines crossing Russia's territory".

5) Chinese National Petroleum Corporation, Asia's largest oil concern, inked a twenty-year deal with Iraq,  estimated to be worth $1.5 to $3 billion, to develop production of 150 to 200 million barrels per day. This is the first  major deal to be struck with the Iraqi National Oil Company since 1972, the year before American oil companies were thrown out of Iraq . Meanwhile, any planned future deals involving US companies like Chevron, EXXON/Mobil, CONOCO/Phillips will not be acted upon (as their spokesmen have made abundantly clear) until Iraq has been “stabilized”.

So, all fussin’ and faffin’ aside, Russian activity in Georgia signals a significant power shift in the control of the Caspian energy base under Moscow ’s aegis. Whether the Bush Administration fully understands this, given its focus on the “hard power” of military forces and strategic alignments, is unclear.

Meanwhile, who benefits? Russia , Kurdistan , Iran, and Uzbekistan . Who has suffered a setback? Georgia , the US , and the Caspian Republics

August 21
An Old Ethnic War and a 'New' Russia
Chris Emery, University of Birmingham

The Western media’s approach to the current conflict between Georgia and Russia has emphasised the immediate diplomatic context: Georgia ’s NATO application, declining relations between Washington and Moscow , Vladimir Putin’s dominant political influence in Moscow , the BTC pipeline, the ramifications for Iranian nuclear negotiations, and US missile defence. Beyond all this, however, is a continuation of an inter-ethnic and inter-national civil war in Georgia which Russia , and specifically Putin, has appropriated for a wider strategic agenda.

If the broad ethnic and national lines of the conflict inside Georgia are relatively unchanged, Russia’s participation in it shows just how far it has come since Tbilisi’s’ last major effort to pacify its two most troublesome regions. Back in 1992 and 1993, Moscow was economically in the pocket of the West, but it was barely reconciled to the collapse of its South Caucasus Empire and, for a short period in October 1993, on the very brink of civil war.  At that time, it was the West’s (and particularly Bill Clinton’s) resolute support for Russian leader Boris Yeltsin that helped Yeltsin prevail, as Washington refrained from criticism of the harsh repression and level of violence that he adopted. Now, however, events point to a strong Russia , economically, politically and militarily confident, that can defy American wishes. Certainly the Russian people seem to be unified behind the political colossus that is Putin and, for the most part, are keenly supportive of his actions in Georgia .

It was a Bolshevik army that ended Georgia ’s short-lived independence in 1921. Abkhazia was established as a Soviet republic, with Russians and Georgians  encouraged to move into the region and Georgian promoted as the official language. A year after the Soviet Georgian government was formed, Moscow created the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast. Again Georgian was enforced as the official language, though Ossetian culture was respected and its language (part of the Iranian branch of the Indo-European language family) was taught in schools.

Whereas Moscow once chose to rule the Ossetians and Abkhazia through Tbilisi , Putin’s differing ambitions in Abkhazian and South Ossetia reflect the wider ethnic and national demographic context of the two separatist regions. In 1926, just 6.7% of those living in Abkhazia indentified themselves as ethnically Russian. By 1959 that figure had risen to 21.4%, due largely to Moscow ’s encouragement of Russian settlers.  Still, this does not necessarily translate into an Abkhazian embrace of membership of the Russian federation . Abkhazians are grateful to receive Russian arms and political support and Moscow is glad to give it,  but this is only part of Putin’s wider strategy, one in which the Ossetians are key.

In South Ossetia, barely more than 2% have ever identified themselves as ethnic Russians, but paradoxically there is a greater “national” sentiment in South Ossetia which can be manipulated by Putin. Of the estimated 700,000 ethnic Ossetians, only 36,000 reside in South Ossetia with well over 500,000 living in the Russian Federation , mainly in Northern Ossetia, a part of the Russian Federation that absorbed some 70,000 South Ossetian refugees around 1990.

The media talk about the Ossetian Diaspora forging strong relations with Russia , but they rarely refer to their common cause: fighting Chechen and Ingush Muslims. Between 1989 and 1992 Ossetian militia battled Ingush fighters in a conflict which saw allegations of Ossetian ethnic cleansing in the Prigorodny District. The Russian state, whose strong anti-Ingush feeling can be traced to allegations of Nazi collaboration during World War II, intervened in a barely disguised act of support for the Ossetians. At best the Russian stance can be described as strongly pro-Ossetian, at worst, one may claim that Russian state forces actively allied with and even led Ossetian fighters in acts of ethnic cleansing.

It is not surprising, therefore, that many South Ossetians seek to rejoin their kin in North Ossetia under the protection of the Russian Federation . The sentiment is manifest in the holding of Russian passports by 70% of the population. Indeed, it was that demonstration of affinity that helped Putin justify Russia ’s intervention.

The net result of this action is uncertain. A referendum in South Ossetia to join the Russian federations is certainly a possibility and would represent a huge strategic coup for Moscow . Tbilisi will do all it can to avoid this, but it is doubtful that ethnic Georgians will ever live in a Georgian South Ossetia. At the moment they are not even permitted to return to their homes whilst their Ossetian neighbours begin the painful task of rebuilding. In Abkhazia, absorption into the Russian state is far less likely, but independence and informal alliance with Moscow are possibilities. The best Georgia can probably hope for is a much looser confederation, but Tbilisi ’s offer of extensive autonomy has for some time fallen on deaf ears. One new, key reality is certain: Georgian troops are unlikely to enter South Ossetia again.

The West essentially has two choices with Moscow . Engagement, the more constructive path, would require at least partial recognition of Russia ’s perspective. For Moscow , the West has armed a Georgian state that killed upwards of 2000 Russian citizens in its bombing campaigns. If the West wants to portray this conflict as a vehicle for a resurgent neo-imperial Russian nationalism, it must also acknowledge the maverick opportunism of Georgian President Saakashvili and the highly charged nationalist twang of his rhetoric.  NATO enlargement will remain a key sticking point, with Moscow ’s perception that it is as an inherently anti-Russian Cold War anachronism unlikely to change.

The revisionist school within Cold War studies, spawned by William Appleman Williams, once urged the West to rethink its attitude to Russian foreign policy, taking into account the trauma of its wartime experiences and asking what role the West played in Moscow ’s sense of vulnerability. Fifty years later, is the demonising of Moscow , or the narrow labeling or its foreign policy as intrinsically nationalist and aggressive, another temptation for which a future generation of scholars will chide us?

But perhaps Western Europe can play a critical role in defusing the confrontation. EU peacekeepers seem the most suited to maintain the fragile peace that exists; the Georgians never considered the previous Russian ‘peacekeepers’ as acceptable and the prospect of American peacekeepers is a non-starter with Moscow. The EU could find both sides asking it to play a constructive role

And there may be a more unexpected buffer. On the face of it, the recent conflict in Georgia was not an ‘energy war’. It was not even a war that had a significant impact on the energy market. Several hundred miles away, however, lay Iran . Those inclined to Machiavellian interpretation might argue that Russia has no interest in Iran ’s international rehabilitation, as this would purely introduce a strong competitor on the gas market.

As such, perhaps the main insulation for Georgia (and Ukraine ) from the Russian ‘gas weapon’ would be the opening up of the Iranian market. How this will affect Russia ’s attitude to Iran in the UN Security Council is unclear. It is not beyond the realms of possibility that the Russians will seek to repair their damaged international reputation, and it is not far-fetched to look at ongoing negotiations with Iran as an ideal situation for Moscow to appear constructive in the eyes of the world. In every crisis there may be an opportunity, even if it is difficult to see how any of them will benefit President Saakashvili.

August 18
Freedom and Terror: The Strange Case of Aafia Siddiqui
Karina Bracken

Two weeks ago, it was announced that a Pakistani US-trained neuroscientist, Dr. Aafia Siddiqui, is to go on trial in New York for the assault and attempted murder of a US soldier while in American custody in Afghanistan .

Siddiqui was initially held by the US military on suspicion of having links with al’Qaida, and the public account of her alleged actions reads like a How to Guide for any terrorist, with images that would keep an American military general awake at night.  According to US authorities, Siddiqui was “grabbing hold of a rifle belonging to one of the soldiers who was trying to arrest her and firing two shots at [the soldiers], while shouting phrases like ‘My blood be directly on your head ’”. None of the US soldiers or FBI agents who were in the room at the time was wounded, but Ms Siddiqui was shot in the arm when one of the soldiers returned fire with a pistol. During the struggle Ms Siddiqui reportedly shouted in English “that she wanted to kill Americans”, which seems to be the requisite behaviour for self-respecting terrorist in American custody --- especially when surrounded by US soldiers and FBI agents.

This week US officials further stated that they arrested Siddiqui on 17 July “in possession of recipes for explosives and chemical weapons, as well as details of landmarks in the United States , including in New York ”. (As every trained neuroscientist/terrorist knows, these items must always be kept together.) Siddiqui is accused of having links with suspected high-ranking al’Qaida operatives who are currently detained at Guantánamo Bay .

So far, so open-and-shut regarding Siddiqui’s perfidy and guilt. It is, however, an incomplete narrative. What was not reported in the American press were the furious protests that erupted in Pakistan after Siddiqui’s family disputed the American military’s version of events. According to the Siddiquis, Aafia was not arrested last month; rather, she has been held by the US military ever since her disappearance from her home in Karachi five years ago. She went missing along with three of her children, all of whom are yet to be located. (The FBI denies having Siddiqui in their custody during these years; however, the official FBI website shows that they have been actively “searching” for her since 2003. Alongside two photographs and Siddiqui’s details, the agency has clarified, “Although the FBI has no information indicating this individual is connected to specific terrorist activities, the FBI would like to locate and question this individual.”)

In an interview with her lawyer in New York , Siddiqui reiterated that she has been held for the last few years (she is now unable to tell how long) and subjected to torture at the hands of her American captors, most likely at Bagram Bay in Afghanistan . Her lawyer, Elaine Whitfield Sharp, told the press that Siddiqui has not yet obtained sufficient medical treatment for her bullet wound. Sharp declined to give details of Siddiqui’s subjection to psychological and physical abuse, but Siddiqui’s sister Fauzia told reporters that Aafia had been “raped repeatedly”. US officials have declined to comment.

Ms Sharp suggests that it is the upcoming presidential election that led to the decision to put Dr. Siddiqui on trial through the regular criminal courts rather than sending her to Guantánamo Bay . Ms Sharp further contended that New York was chosen because it was home to the Twin Towers that were destroyed by al’Qaida, so sentiment there would be most prejudicial top Ms Siddiqui. 

Aafia Siddiqui was the first woman to be sought by the US in connection with al’Qaida. Whatever the merits of that prosecution, her allegations and those of her family raise troubling questions amidst the recent history of “extreme interrogation” by the US military and intelligence service. The claims of Ms Siddiqui’s sister that she has been repeatedly rape in custody is far from the first time that the US military has been charged; one only has to review the treatment of  suspected female members of the Vietcong by US soldiers and US sponsored forces.

The Siddiqui family’s allegations of rape against the US forces will  not be investigated. There will be no call for an enquiry or condemnation from the White House. Because Siddiqui is a terror suspect, she does not deserve the fruits of our Western justice system. Because she is not of Western origin, even though she was a US resident and her disappeared children have American citizenship, the tense American relationship with Pakistan is likely to impede the justice that she, or her family, may seek.

August 18
Freedom and Terror: The University of Nottingham Case
Hicham Yezza

[This article is reprinted from The Guardian. ---- SL]

The UN's committee on human rights has just published a report criticising Britain's anti-terror laws and the resulting curbs on civil liberties. For many commentators the issues raised are mostly a matter of academic abstractions and speculative meanderings. For me, it is anything but. These laws have destroyed my life.

On May 14 I was arrested under section 41 of the Terrorism Act - on suspicion of the "instigation, preparation and commission of acts of terrorism": an absurdly nebulous formulation that told me nothing about the sin I had apparently committed. Once in custody, almost 48 hours passed before it was confirmed that the entire operation (involving dozens of officers, police cars, vans, and scientific support agents) was triggered by the presence on my University of Nottingham office computer of an equally absurd document called the "al-Qaida Training Manual", a declassified open-source document that I had never read and had completely forgotten about since it had been sent to me months before.

Rizwaan Sabir, a politics student friend of mine (who was also arrested), had downloaded the file from the US justice department website while conducting research on terrorism for his upcoming PhD. An extended version of the same document (which figures on the politics department's official reading list) was also available on Amazon. I edit a political magazine; Rizwaan regularly sent me copies of research materials he was using, and this document was one.

Within hours of my incarceration I had lost track of time. I often awoke thinking I had been asleep for days only to discover it wasn't midnight yet. My confidence in the competence (and motives) of the police ebbed away. I found myself shifting my energies from remaining cheerful to remaining sane. In the early hours, I was often startled by the metallic toilet seat, crouched in the corner like some sinister beast.

For days on end, I drew cartoons and wrote diary entries in the margins of Mills and Boon novellas. I spent hours reciting things to myself: names of Saul Bellow characters, physics Nobel prize winners, John Coltrane albums, anything to keep the numbness away.

I'm constantly coming across efforts being made to give detention without charge the Walt Disney treatment: the crushing weight of solitary confinement is painted as a non-issue; the soul-sapping nothingness of the claustrophobic, cold cell is portrayed as a mild inconvenience. Make no mistake: the feeling that one's fate is in the hands of the very people who are apparently trying to convict you is, without doubt, one of the most devastating horrors a human being can ever be subjected to. It is (to misquote Carl von Clausewitz) the continuation of torture by other means.

"Those who have nothing to hide, have nothing to fear," goes the tautological reasoning of the paranoia merchants calling for harsher, ever more draconian "security" measures - as we saw throughout the 42-days debate. They should read Kafka: nothing is more terrifying than being arrested for something you know you haven't done. Indeed, it is the innocent who suffers the most because it is the innocent who is tormented the most. The guilty calculates, triangulates, anticipates. The innocent doesn't know where to start. The answers and the questions are absolute, unbreachable, towering conundrums.

I underwent 20 hours of vigorous interrogation while entire days were being completely wasted by the police micro-examining every detail of my life: my political activism, my writings, my work in theatre and dance, my love life, my photography, my cartooning, my magazine subscriptions, my bus tickets.

Aspects of my life that would have been seen as commendable in others were suddenly viewed as suspect in my case for no apparent reason other than my religious and ethnic background. I was guilty of being that strangest of creatures: a Muslim who reads; who studied engineering yet writes about Bob Dylan; was a vocal opponent of the Iraq war yet owns all of Christopher Hitchens' writings; admires Terry Eagleton yet defends Martin Amis; interviews Kazuo Ishiguro, listens to Leonard Cohen, goes to Radiohead concerts, all of which became the subject of rather bizarre questioning.

This is not all: outside, lives are shattered, jobs are lost, marriages are destroyed, minds are damaged, friends and families are traumatised - often irrevocably so. My parents, whom I wasn't allowed to call, could barely get any sleep throughout the ordeal. Many of my Muslim university friends were, and still are, worried about being targeted themselves. For most of my loved ones, despite my innocence, nothing will ever be the same again. I'm now jobless, facing destitution and threatened with deportation from the country I've called home for nearly half my life.

Immense pressure is exerted on law enforcement agencies by their political mandarins to produce "results": pressure to produce a higher number of arrests but also the corollary, more dangerous, impulse to justify them at any cost. Naturally, through a perverted but pervasive circularity in the logic, lack of evidence becomes the very justification for requesting "more time". The government claims that checks and balances will ensure extensions to detention periods are based on verifiable and compelling arguments. I beg to differ: in my case, the judge was simply bullied by streams of technospeak until she had no option but to grant extra time.

Fighting terrorism is a serious matter and needs to be tackled in a serious way - not through empty gimmicks sustained by fear-mongering and alarmist rhetoric. The real danger is that we are witnessing a slide from the essential purity of habeas corpus into a Britain where the innocent are detained until proven guilty.

· Hicham Yezza, an activist and writer, was released without charge after six days in custody, immediately rearrested on immigration charges and issued with a removal order to Algeria, after which he was held for a further 27 days; he is still awaiting a conclusion to his deportation case

July 29
Nottingham and Academic Freedom: An Update

Heartfelt thanks to all those who wrote after last week's blog and the subsequent publication of the letter in the Times Higher Education. I was particularly moved by this response from Munab Younis:

"I am a Muslim studying politics here at the University of Nottingham, and you expressed quite accurately the outrageously patronising nature of the university's actions. It is indeed the case that the university thinks it can 'protect me' from my (seemingly genetic) predisposition to becoming the wrong sort of terrorist by threatening to call the police if I attempt to study them.
Meanwhile, I am permitted to study declassified CIA and U.S. military manuals - most of them, horrifically brutal - because, well, they're not 'terrorist materials'.

"The climate of fear and suspicion that has grown on our campus has become quite intolerable and we need people to speak out."

July 21
Terrorism's Victory: The Prosecution of Understanding
An Open Letter to the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Nottingham
Scott Lucas, University of Birmingham

July 2
After Lisbon, What Next for the Trans-Atlantic?
Colette Mazzucelli, Molloy College

Crisis Mode is Not an Option

The Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty on June 12, 2008 by a margin of 53.4% to 46.6% of citizens voting prolongs the internal policy debate about external relations in the European Union (EU). Previous treaty revisions, particularly the Single European Act, signed in 1986, and the Treaty on European Union, signed in 1992, introduced reforms that led to substantial policy innovations. Notable among those are the internal market and the Euro.

The Lisbon Treaty introduces modifications to the Union’s international profile, including a permanent President of the European Council, a High Representative of the Union in Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and an EU diplomatic service. Ireland’s negative vote must not provide the excuse for another period of introspection. In the aftermath of failed referenda in France and the Netherlands during 2005, the demise of the European Constitutional Treaty led the Union to turn inward. In the present global environment, a crisis mode only serves to fuel the external perception that the EU is a ‘diminishing asset’ just as more is expected of Europe from its allies, particularly the United States. Sadly, Ireland’s vote reveals that the Union has acted on credit vis-à-vis its allies and other third party actors. Those who expected the Lisbon reforms to be implemented by January 1, 2009 still believe the Treaty will eventually come into force. Others like Czech President Vaclav Klaus have declared that the Lisbon Treaty project ended with the Irish vote and that ratifications cannot continue. Across the Atlantic, Lisbon still matters in what may be identified as the assets-expectations differential.

The Union’s leaders have decided not to take any decisions to address the Irish referendum until later this year. Steps are likely to be taken during France’s program for the Trio Presidency, which begins on July 1. France will be followed by the Czech Republic in January and Sweden in July 2009. There are several options on the table to move ahead, which the Trio leadership must consider. These include the prospect of a second Irish referendum, negotiating a new treaty, or accepting a Union in which some member states integrate more fully, and quickly, than others. Realistically, there is neither the desire nor the intention to reopen treaty negotiations. Presently, the Union continues to operate under the rules of the Nice system articulated in the text negotiated under the French Presidency in 2000. The Nice Treaty was initially rejected by the Irish population in a 2001 referendum only to be approved in a second vote by which time the original text had been modified.

The Crux of the Differential

Despite the failure of the Irish referendum, the EU continues to function well in a whole host of areas related to the internal market and the single European currency. Even in external relations and foreign affairs, the European Commission and the High Representative in the Council, Mr. Javier Solana, continue their work with the member states and third party actors throughout the world. The Lisbon Treaty’s rejection puts on hold a number of fundamental changes to the EU’s system of decision making. These changes add more complexity to the system without necessarily enhancing its legitimacy.

The EU has genuine assets to offer, which its allies, particularly the United States, expect will be put on the table in coming months. The EU’s tendency to turn inward corresponds to its own disappointed expectations about the treaty reform process. In external relations, the member states do not require Lisbon to maximize their assets as they move ahead with ad hoc initiatives. The E3 diplomacy vis-à-vis Iran is now complemented by EU sanctions against the Islamic Republic. Defense cooperation among the big Six, which Mr. Sarkozy has already proposed, can advance in the coming months with skillful diplomacy. French defense initiatives raise concerns for the Irish who remain attached to a policy of neutrality. The French Presidency’s focus on the big member states risks alienating other small members as well as those European institutions, Commission and Parliament, which have no competence in defense.

Such tensions are likely to spill over into the Lisbon reflections. The political dynamics of failed expectations matter inside the EU. Expectations from Washington, likely to come from the next Democratic or Republican Administration, are intrinsically different.  The US expects that European countries will demonstrate leadership identifying compromises in which their individual and collective assets contribute solutions to challenges the respective Unions must face together. The assets-expectations differential speaks directly to the painful reality the United States acknowledges as a legacy of successive Bush 43 Administrations. As other powers rise in relation to America and Europe, neither continent can be successful acting on its own.     

Merkel’s Leadership: A Lengthy Electoral Campaign 

In an influential essay, Kori Schake (‘The US elections and Europe: The coming crisis of high expectations,’ Center for European Reform, November 2007) focuses attention on Chancellor Angela Merkel as the leader in transatlantic relations who knows how to “identify problems, take initiatives, craft agreements other countries can support, and then turn to the US for the contribution needed to close or enforce the deal”.  In the run up to the November election, the German Chancellor demonstrates the ability and interest to work with the candidate elected as the next American president.

It is important to understand that the 2009 German campaign for the Chancellorship has unofficially begun. This is the political reality, which has significant implications for transatlantic and intra-European relations. It is not yet clear which candidate Chancellor Merkel will run against in the September 2009 federal elections. The Left’s rise to the position of the fourth largest party in the Federal Republic speaks to the radicalization of politics amidst popular apprehension concerning a range of issues, including globalization and immigration. The candidate emerging as a likely choice to run against the Chancellor is the present foreign minister in Merkel’s grand coalition, Frank-Walter Steinmeier. By the end of 2008, it should be clear whether Foreign Minister Steinmeier will oppose Chancellor Merkel in federal elections. It is difficult to imagine how in the next year Germany might contribute to a host of transatlantic policy initiatives, ranging from domestic security to out-of-area engagement, for which the United States relies on its support.

NATO’s 60^th Anniversary Summit: Prospects for US Reengagement 

Next year marks the 20^th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall. In retrospect, November 9, 1989 transformed the postwar environment. The years after September 11, 2001 fundamentally altered America’s perception of its own vulnerability, thereby contributing to the construction of a unique narrative. The structural change two decades ago takes precedence in terms of the impact on US relations with Germany and its European neighbors. The two sides of the Atlantic still grapple with the demise of the Cold War in their search for new ways to engage during the 21^st century.    

One prominent issue at the top of the French Presidency’s Council agenda this fall is defense. This is a dossier where President Sarkozy aims to make genuine progress. After years of policy making outside the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) integrated military command structure, France is serious about reintegration. Nonetheless, the closing of bases in country may hold the NATO issue hostage. Negotiations must take place to set preconditions and respect specific French caveats to a full reintegration into the military command structure. Only time will tell if President Sarkozy can identify the internal compromises to allow reintegration and mitigate the domestic opposition within the French army and conservative elements in his own political coalition. The price of reintegration may be tensions within the French-German relationship concerning NATO out-of-area engagement.   

The most pressing issue for the United States with its European allies is to gain their commitments to increase contributions in Afghanistan. The NATO Anniversary Summit in April 2009 poses difficulties of timing, engagement, and, most importantly, agenda. The timing will be early in the new American administration. For Mr. McCain, his initial months in office will likely be devoted to filling the ranks of policy makers after 8 years of Republicans in office. For Mr. Obama, the first 100 days will hardly provide the opportunity to prepare intensively for such an important diplomatic meeting. In the face of challenges in Iraq, Afghanistan / Pakistan, and Iran, the US will likely rely on the EU to address a difficult situation in newly independent Kosovo. The Balkans is the only area within Europe where NATO is still potentially relevant. The challenge to NATO’s legitimacy is addressed to the extent that its members are willing to engage out-of-area to address unconventional threats – the earthquake in Pakistan, the violence in Darfur. These are crises in areas where France is more likely to send an expeditionary force and where Germany, owing to its particular domestic situation, is not.

The challenge for the NATO Anniversary Summit is to define an agenda for US re-engagement in the midst of tremendously difficult internal political situations, particularly in the Federal Republic. The early timing requires that the agenda be focused tightly, which necessitates out of the box thinking on both sides of the Atlantic. The key to success is to reengage the United States in a way that brings France and Germany on board despite their diverse internal situations. If France and Germany, as Summit hosts, can agree, the likelihood of the other members identifying their interests in an eventual compromise is greater. On the US side, it is not too early to contemplate possible choices for US Secretary of Defense that could establish a bi-partisan consensus in policy making. One name that has already been suggested is Senator Chuck Hagel, an Eisenhower Republican who has taken issue with his party on a range of issues, particularly Iraq.  The stakes at the NATO Anniversary Summit are high. This is why the significant obstacles to success must be addressed, sooner rather than later, by Republicans and Democrats alike.    

July 1
The Bush Legacy
John Matlin, University of Birmingham

Of late, much has been written of the so-called legacy of the 43^rd president. “Legacy” is defined as something one bequeaths. It has a lasting quality. The probable legacy of Bush’s foreign policy has been widely discussed, together with some of the problems of his domestic policy, for example the mishandling of Hurricane Katrina

Good, substantial evidence of the Bush legacy will be found in the rulings of the Supreme Court. Bush has filled two vacancies on a bench already largely nominated by Republican presidents. Should Mr Obama become the 44^th president, he will likely find the Supreme Court not so much a legacy from his predecessor, more a poisoned chalice.

Two decisions of the Supreme Court this week indicate the nature of rulings which can be expected from this Supreme Court. First, “the Millionaire’s Amendment”, part of the 2002 McCain-Feingold campaign finance law, was struck down. The law sought to impose special rules in races where a candidate financed his or her own campaign. For example, candidates for the House who spent more than $350,000 entitled opponents to receive triple the usual amounts - $6,900 rather than $2,300 – from individual contributors. The intention was to level, to an extent, the money playing field. Justice Alito gave the majority opinion and was supported by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice s Kennedy, Scalia and Thomas. Alito’s rationale for rejecting the law was that asymmetry imposed by the law was unacceptable and dismissed the compensation element intended to combat greater financial resources.  For the striking justices, not only is money equated to speech but it is equated to power too.

The second Court decision affirmed that the Second Amendment protected the right of an individual to own a gun in all circumstances. How the justices ignored the phrase in the Second Amendment, “linking the right to the maintenance of a “well-regulated militia”, is difficult to understand. Scalia‘s opinion was that the intention of the framers was to prevent elimination of the militia, hence the amendment was not restrictive. Since the amendment actually says the opposite, one has to scratch one’s head at the ability of a lawyer to overturn meaning. This reactionary justice would likely find that nine camels can indeed dance on the head of a pin. 

Scalia was supported by the other usual suspects, Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito. One wonders if these justices will become known as the Five Horsemen of the Apocalypse, harking back to FDR’s New Deal court. It is very doubtful that a Democratic president will be tempted to increase the numbers of Supreme Court justices to protect his legislative agenda, no matter how right-wing and provocative the rulings may be. Accordingly, the Bush legacy will endure to the disappointment of those with fond memories of justices like Brandeis and to the rulings of the Warren and Burger courts.

June 27
When the US Offends its Allies
Dr Abdullah Al Shayji

Recently, there has been public outcry in several of the GCC states after a series of very public snubs by Washington . In a report issued last week, the U.S. State department criticized and blacklisted many of the Gulf nations because of their “weak performance” in tackling Human Trafficking.  On the 13^th June, the US Treasury Department froze the assets of a Kuwait-based charity organisation, Revival of Islamic Heritage Society while linking it to Al Qaeda. Finally at the end of May the US House of Representatives approved a legislation that would allow the United States to sue the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) under its antitrust laws. Dr. Abdullah Alshayeji, a professor of International Relations at Kuwait University, has kindly given permission to reprint his article, first published in the Gulf News.  He asserts in comments to us that his piece expresses: “The GCC states’ unprecedented display of anger at Washington unnecessarily targeting its strategic allies” despite “their invaluable contribution to stability in the region.”

 
 Abdullah Alshayeji, Dr Abdullah Al Shayji is a Professor of International Relations and the Head of the American Studies Unit- Kuwait University.

 We can sense growing suspicion in the asymmetric relationship between the US and the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states due to America 's divergent view and position on GCC issues, which the member states - collectively and individually - deem as either unfriendly or interfering in their domestic affairs.

 The GCC states are frustrated at Washington 's lack of gratitude and appreciation for their invaluable contribution to stability and security in the region and for pursuing the path of moderation in the Middle East .

 As part of the axis of moderation, the GCC plays a major role in Iraq , ensures energy security and generates sovereign wealth.

 But it was all ignored by the US Congress when the US House of Representatives approved a legislation that would allow the United States to sue the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (Opec) under its antitrust laws.

 New York Times columnist, Thomas Evan, too joined the fray and wrote an opinion article titled "Sue OPEC".

 With the unprecedented increase in oil prices which is now hovering around $140 per barrel, only the GCC states can calm the world's fears of rising oil prices. Saudi Arabia took the initiative and increased its daily oil output by 200,000 barrels and also held a conference to address the significant relationship between the oil producing and oil consuming countries.

 Furthermore, the GCC is a regional power house and this year's accumulative Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is expected to reach nearly $1 trillion, up from $800 billion last year.

 The major clout that the GCC has is its dominant status of a soft power in terms of oil and gas output. In addition, their collective sovereign wealth makes the GCC states a global world player, compensating for their lack of size and lack of hard power.

 As the Economist put it, "The Gulf added $215 billion to its stock of foreign assets in 2007, the IIF calculates. This hoard is divided between the region's central banks, its sovereign-wealth funds and its wealthy sovereigns.

 It added up to $1.8 trillion by the end of last year, by the IIF's estimates, and more like $2.4 trillion, according to Brad Setser of the Council on Foreign Relations and Rachel Ziemba of RGE Monitor."

 The US State Department's Eighth Annual Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP) or modern day slavery, published in early June was deemed offensive by the GCC states.

 The US insists that the report is "dedicated to ending human trafficking, a deeply dehumanising form of exploitation. In virtually every country around the world, including the United States , men, women and children are held in domestic servitude, exploited for commercial sex, coerced into work in factories and sweatshops. In some, children are forcibly recruited as soldiers".

 Mark Lagon, the US State Department's senior adviser on human-trafficking elaborated: "For the last four years, the weak performance of several nations in the Gulf has been the matter of great concern and disappointment."

 But he added that he was "happy to report that the UAE and Bahrain continued to make significant improvements, notably the UAE. It is a model in the region."

 The report kept the other four GCC states in the blacklist with threat of sanctions against Kuwait , Oman , Qatar and Saudi Arabia because their governments have taken serious steps to deal with "trafficking in people".

Display of anger

The GCC countries dismissed the report as "unjustified" and their foreign ministers chastised the US in an unprecedented public display of anger. The statement by the foreign ministers said that they "deeply regret the wrong information on the GCC states contained in a US State Department report for 2008 on human trafficking".

In a serious tone, they added, "[This information] aims to practice unjustified pressure for political ends," and asked the US to "revise its unfriendly policy towards GCC countries".

The divide between the US and the GCC widened further when the US Treasury Department, not to be outdone by the State Department, froze the assets of a Kuwait-based charity organisation, Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS).

It is one of the most respected charity organisations, managed by the Salafi group. The Salafis, along with their allies, won 10 seats or 20 per cent of the seats in Kuwait 's parliament in the elections held last month. In the new Cabinet, there is also a senior minister belonging to this group.

Without providing any material evidence to support its claim, the US has accused the charity organisation of supporting and funding Al Qaida.

In his report, the US Treasury Department's Stuart Levey, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, has alleged "RIHS of using charity and humanitarian assistance as covers to fund terrorist activity and harm innocent civilians, often in poor and impoverished regions".

Furthermore, the report accuses the senior leadership of RIHS of being "aware of both legitimate and illegitimate uses of RIHS funds".

RIHS offices have also been closed or raided by the governments of Albania , Azerbaijan , Bangladesh , Bosnia-Herzegovina , Cambodia , and Russia over suspicion that the charity is allegedly linked with the funding of terrorism.

The decision by the US Treasury Department has raised many eye-brows in Kuwait and has led to official and public outcry. In a show of solidarity and support, the Emir of Kuwait, Shaikh Sabah Al Ahmad Al Jaber Al Sabah, met with the leaders of RIHS and praised their charitable works in all parts of the Muslim world.

The Cabinet called the US allegations baseless and the parliament and its Speaker accused the US of interfering in Kuwait 's sovereignty. They also reminded the US that it was living in a glass house and should not throw stones at others.

In reference to the dismal human rights record of the US , they stated that Washington has no moral authority to lecture other nations because it doesn't practice what it preaches.

The strategic partnership between the US , the dominant power, and the GCC, its junior partners, should be based on mutual trust and respect, and nurtured by mutual appreciation and gratitude as both sides need each other.

Even though such an unhealthy environment won't affect the strategic relationship between them, it will exacerbate unneeded tension and foster an unhealthy environment that won't benefit either side.

June 26
Reading Israeli Intentions on Iran
Ray Close

[Ray Close, a former CIA official and perceptive observer of the Middle East, has sent us the following commentary on an interview in Mother Jones with Yossi Melman, correspondent specialising in intelligence matters for the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz. Both Melman's remarks and Close's commentary are, we think, the shrewdest assessment of the recent Israeli military exercises and the theory that they are a forerunner to an attack on Iran. --- SL]

Based on what I have heard from Israeli friends of my own, I would say that Melman's remarks
are a fair description of what the most sensible and balanced Israelis feel, and I think their common sense will prevail.  I only wish I had the same confidence in the prudent judgment of some lame ducks I can think of in Washington.

I think the extensive international press coverage of the Israeli exercise indicates that they are probably NOT planning to attack Iran, at least in the immediate future. They seem to have deliberately called attention to their activity, as if disappointed that the world had not been
sufficiently impressed by the display of power and "strategic reach" that they had demonstrated. That supports the theory that it was an effort to send a political message (to their own people as well as to the world) just as much as it was a practical military training exercise. The Israelis place an exceptionally high value on the element of surprise. Every aspect of their military experience over the years since 1948 has taught them that.  In this
case, if they were planning to attack Iran, they would have hit first, and boasted about it only afterwards.

What to Make of a Recent Israeli Military Exercise:
Interview with Israeli Intel Correspondent

LAURA ROZEN, MOTHER JONES

While many people are concerned about whether the Bush administration plans to carry out a parting shot strike on Iran's nuclear program before it leaves office, most policy experts in and out of government I've interviewed think that is unlikely, for a lot of reasons. But the U.S., of course, is not the only actor to consider.

Today came reports that Israel carried out a large-scale military exercise over the eastern Mediterranean and Greece earlier this month that clearly seemed to have Iran in mind. More than 100 F-16 and F-15 fighter planes and rescue helicopters were involved in the Israeli military exercise, according to Pentagon and other US government officials cited in a report today in the New York Times. "Several American officials said the Israeli exercise appeared to be an effort to develop the militaryʼs capacity to carry out long-range strikes and to demonstrate the seriousness with which Israel views Iranʼs nuclear program," the paper reported. The exercise was so large, U.S. officials told the paper, it was implied that Israel wanted not only Iran, but the US and other allies, to be aware of it.

I asked Yossi Melman, intelligence correspondent for Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz, and co-author of The Nuclear Sphinx of Iran, how to interpret the reported Israeli military exercise (Israeli officials have not commented on it). I also asked him about Israel's timeline for contemplating a possible go-it-alone strike on Iran's nuclear facilities, should diplomacy, international sanctions and other measures be judged to fail.

Mother Jones: How to interpret the exercise?

Melman: The Israeli Air Force and all the other agencies are preparing tentative contingency plans. This has been going on for many many months. Israel's air space is limited, so you need to fly over the sea, but to practice you also need land. To do it over Turkey will not be sufficient (1500-1800 km) and politically sensitive. So there is an Israeli Greek security agreement [for this purpose] and that's what they are doing.

Now does it mean an imminent attack? Far from that. I don't see at the moment an Israeli cabinet which has the nerve to take such a decision. But as I wrote in my book and in my newspaper and in various international forums recently, Israel will probably do it as a last resort.

MJ: What is Israel's thinking on timing?

Melman: Of course they will wait. Israel will never do it before having some sort of understanding (tacit or not) with the U.S. administration. If they decide to do it, it will not be before spring - mid 2009 most probably, end of 2009, unless they realize something dramatic is boiling up in Iran. I think they will wait also for Iran's presidential elections to see if [Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad] is reelected. (Those Iranian presidential elections are May or June 2009).

MJ: Do you think there is a possibility that increased diplomacy and international sanctions could succeed? I was at a forum today where both speakers - including Patrick Clawson - who you've interviewed - expressed some degree of mild optimism that reinvigorated multilateral diplomacy might succeed to persuade Iran to some sort of agreement on its nuclear program. And that it would be far preferable to the military option. Former Israeli intelligence chief Efraim Halevy has also expressed the belief that negotiations with Iran could succeed. What are your thoughts about this? And indeed, about the highly politicized question in the U.S. presidential race about whether Washington should pursue direct diplomacy with Iran? (before contemplating such "last resort" options)?

Melman: I favor direct talks between the U.S. and Iran. But I am very pessimistic about the success of any talks or diplomacy. As long as China and Russia are not part of the loop no diplomatic pressure would succeed. Yet there is a need to exhaust the diplomatic path, if only to show domestic audiences that the West is not trigger happy or a war monger.

June 26
Iran's Nuclear Programme and the Latest "Western" Proposal
 Mohammad Rezaie, University of Birmingham

Javier Solana, the chief European negotiator, was in Tehran last weekend and discussed the file on Iran’s nuclear programmes. Accompanied by the directors of the foreign ministries of all the “5+1” countries except the United States, Solana delivered a long-awaited package of proposals to the Iranian Foreign Minister and held talks with Saeed Jalili, the chief Iranian nuclear negotiator.
 
Solana’s package was delivered to Iran as President Bush was touring Europe. Even ahead of Solana’s trip, Bush was using strong language to warn Iran about the consequences of rejecting the offer. He said that “all options are on the table”, implying the readiness of the United States to use force if necessary, and he lobbied hard to win the support of US allies in Europe for another round of sanctions at the UN or, if resisted by China and Russia, by the EU countries with the United States.

On Saturday, when the speaker of the Iranian government repeated Tehran’s position rejecting any suspension of uranium enrichment, Bush wasted no time in criticising Iran for dismissing out of hand what he called a generous offer. This immediate reaction was interpreted by some analysts as an attempt to show that the offer was effectively dead on arrival, although Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice tried to soften the US position by saying that the US would await the formal reaction. She repeated Bush’s words that all options were on the table but tried to allay concerns that the US was inching towards military option by stating that American energies were focused on diplomacy.
     
The Iranian Government has now said that it will give its response after thorough examination of the offer, emphasizing that these answers would depend upon how its own proposals are treated. In another sign that Iran will give due consideration to the 5+1 offer, Speaker of the Parliament and former nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani said that the parliament will study the package “with alertness”.

The content of the 5+1 package is similar to the package delivered to Iran in 2006. Even some Western journalists and diplomats have said the package is merely an enhanced or  refreshed version of 2006 package. The suspension of enrichment as a precondition for the official start of the negotiation with 5+1 countries; at the same, the package  recognizes Iran’s rights in accordance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and offers technological and economic incentives to Iran, including the construction of light water reactors.
 
If the new offer is, more or less similar to the 2006 offer, why did its drafters did not take into consideration the advancement by Iran in its peaceful nuclear activities during the last two years? Why do they insist on inclusion of a precondition in their offer when they know how sensitive this issue is in Iran? It seems that the 5+1 countries are only interested in portraying a positive image of a new initiative while in reality failing to put forward any constructive ideas. Furthermore, they also hope that, in the present internal situation of Iran with the Iranian people facing an economic embargo and the fear of  future sanctions and even an attack, the Iranian Government would be pressured into accepting the  package.

The carrot and stick policy is not going to work with Iran; rather it will worsen the situation. The talk of military strike against Iran, raised again before and during Solana’s visit, has complicated the situation, making it harder for the EU President to present his case genuinely and succeed. The smoke coming out of Western chimneys also incidates that embargoes are moving to a different level, with the sanctions and freezing of the assets in Europe of the largest Iranian bank, Bank Melli, and the listing  of  certain individuals and companies who must not enter Europe. What makes these steps even more counter-productive is that they have been taken  while Iran is still investigating the Solana offer.

In such a context, the 5+1 countries are jeopardizing diplomacy with Iran, who perceives that negotiations are superficial when compared with other economic and diplomatic action. Pressures from outside will unite most Iranians regardless of their political affiliations, only hardening the position of the Government.

If the 5+1 countries genuinely want to achieve a settlement, they would be wise to work for a genuine resolution on the issue of atomic energy. The key is to find common elements in the Solana package and the Iranian proposal, working with pragmatists such as Ali Larijani, once the key negotiator and now the Head of the Iranian Parliament.. 

June 25
That US Prsidential Election (So Far)
 Reg Whitaker, York University (Toronto)/University of Victoria

The American presidential contest has gripped the world. Even in the convulsive last stages of the Bush catastrophe, even as America’s image abroad falters, and its influence wanes, the American political system has somehow asserted the kind of magnetic mass attraction that once characterized Hollywood and American television: Hillary Clinton rising phoenix-like from the humiliation of Monica Lewinsky to become the first woman at the door of the White House; Barack Obama as some kind of unlikely fiction thought up by a screenwriter on hallucinogens (“a black guy whose middle name is Hussein comes out of nowhere and sweeps the nation…”); McCain a war hero captured and tortured by the Communists who comes riding out of the West to clean up Washington. What a show!

Apart from the show, which is indeed entertaining, and digging a little deeper, this is really a good news, bad news story.

We can get the good news out of the way quickly enough, as it has already been widely trumpeted. The Democratic contest pitted candidates representing two hugely significant groups in American life hitherto excluded from the highest office: African-Americans and women. More than 140 years after the Civil War and the end of slavery, an African-American stands a very good chance of attaining the presidency. In the course of the Obama/Clinton contest, a huge number of new voters, especially among young Americans who had been abandoning the political realm for years now, flocked to the polls with apparent high enthusiasm. This seems surely to indicate a rejuvenation of American democracy at the very moment that Washington under Bush has sunk to new lows in arrogance, reckless incompetence, and ethical squalor.

One bad news reflection on Obama’s victory can be dismissed. The bitter claims of some feminist supporters of Clinton that male chauvinism and hatred of women had brought down their candidate, while understandable at an emotional level, do not stand up to analysis.

Much has been made, quite rightly, of the appalling male chauvinist attitudes on display in the media. But the Hillary-the-Nutcracker snickers were all coming, without exception, from the usual suspects on the Right (of whom, to be sure, there are no end on radio and television). None of these people, however, are Democrats. Within the Democratic party, there was little evidence that sexism was at play in the vote. 

Quite the contrary: although Hillary called in all the feminist themes when she finally was forced to endorse Obama, she had played fast and loose with gender throughout her campaign. Her insistent self-identification as a military hawk had led to her support for Bush’s Iraq fiasco – a major reason for her failure to capture the large antiwar constituency in the Democratic party – and to her ‘ready, aye ready’ for a replay fiasco over Iran (she would “totally obliterate” the country if Ahmadinejad attacked Israel). This was classic overcompensation for the perception that a woman might be considered weak on national security, but it played directly into the hands of Obama who had opposed the Iraq war from the beginning. The irony was that Obama much better represents the supposed feminine style of leadership (consensual, collaborative, and compromising) than the relentless Alpha Dog battler Hillary - a point not lost on the Right, already readying an attack on Obama as an effeminate girly-man.

Midway through the campaign, Hillary began putting on a new face: a pistol-packin’, deer-huntin’, beer and whiskey chuggin’, NASCAR drivin’, God-fearin’, good ole girl with balls. Bizarre as this might seem for an ostensible feminist, it worked with the white working class male voters in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and other rustbelt areas – the old Reagan Democrats – who flocked to her side. So much for a male backlash!

In retrospect, it turns out that Hillary only took a slim majority of all female votes. Older white women overwhelmingly endorsed her, while younger women went preponderantly for Obama. Among those between 35 and 65, only a small margin was registered for Hillary. Almost all of Hillary’s supporters will eventually rally to Obama in a contest with McCain who wants to make abortion illegal again and represents all the old militarist and aggressive foreign policy stands and hard-eyed right-wing social policies that women tend to distrust. Already one poll has shown a staggering 19% gender gap in Obama’s favour among women.

So much for the good news. There is also much about this campaign that is less bright and encouraging, and this is worth discussion since it has had so little play.

First, the appalling length of the campaign. It sometimes seems as if it will never end. What began sixteen months ago finally ground to one short-term resolution on June 3, when Obama squeezed out the final few delegate pledges needed to put him irretrievably over the top and assured of nomination.

Of course, this was only the end of the beginning: another half year will wear on through the presidential election proper, with Obama-McCain debates replacing Obama-Clinton debates as semi-weekly television fixtures (McCain wants weekly ‘town-halls’ throughout the summer); interminable panels of talking heads doomed to repeating the same things over and over; bloggers talking at and past other bloggers in self-referencing internet loops; non-stop funding appeals that compete shrilly with the evangelicals and the 1-800 ‘call now!’ con-artists; continuous rounds of candidates shaking hands, posing for photo-ops, tossing out the same banal campaign McNuggets stop after stop to audiences that must seem finally interchangeable, indistinguishable, to the numbed protagonists.

In late November, one candidate will pass the finish line (barring another Florida hanging-chad debacle) and then be thrown into a furious two months of appointments and patronage dispensing as the new White House is organized, followed by the inauguration in January 2009. The next morning, the new President will finally begin Day One of his four-year term. He might be forgiven at this point, especially if he turns out to be the 72 year old McCain, to wonder at the wisdom of a system that puts potential presidents through a nomination and election process as grueling, or more grueling, and at least half as long, as the job itself. A serious question is what effect this marathon 24/7 campaigning has on the human beings who are the presidents-in-waiting? Is this the training ground any rational person would devise for the job of running the most powerful nation on earth, with a finger on the nuclear trigger awaiting Hillary Clinton’s famous 3 a.m. call on the red phone in the White Hose bedroom? Or is it instead the kind of discipline designed to break a wild horse or lobotomize an otherwise autonomous individual?

One is reminded of Henry Adams’ 1880 novel Democracy, in which his protagonist, Mrs. Lee, is shocked to see at the White House “two seemingly mechanical figures, which might be wood or wax, for any sign they showed of life…the President and his wife… stiff and awkward by the door, their faces stripped of every sign of intelligence, while the right hands of both extended themselves to the column of visitors with the mechanical action of toy dolls.” Mrs. Lee is struck by the fact that “in all that crowd there was no one besides herself who felt the mockery of this exhibition…They thought it a democratic institution, this droll aping of monarchical forms….To her it had the effect of a nightmare, or of an opium-eater’s vision. She felt a sudden conviction that this was to be the end of American society; its realisation and dream at once. She groaned in spirit.”

Adams’ America was a pre-electronic media and pre-internet world. Today everything is speeded up to manic intensity, demanding that candidates be on call and on camera at all times. The media old and new are on permanent war footing, which in this context means not so much coverage of evolving policy as a relentless gaffe watch. The panoptic gaze sweeps into every nook and cranny of the candidates’ existence and of everyone associated with them in any way, however peripheral. An offhanded but ill-chosen word is fed back relentlessly to cow a candidate and ensure that their message is made yet blander and yet paler. Behold how Obama’s word “bitter” with reference to the bypassed working class was whipped into a firestorm of faux populist indignation that may well have cost him crucial votes in the Pennsylvania and Ohio primaries, and may still cost him in November.

Offensive sermons by pastors in churches that candidates may have attended are circulated relentlessly on YouTube to discredit the hapless church-goers: the Rev. Jeremiah Wright as Obama albatross was matched by a pair of hate-spouting evangelicals attached to McCain. All had to be cast off publicly and denounced. Nobody, it seems, in either camp would dare suggest that the idle ravings of distantly affiliated religious zealots might be considered irrelevant to the worthiness of the candidates themselves.

Now that Hillary has been dispatched, politically prurient attention has turned to Obama’s wife, Michelle, who made a single injudicious remark about being proud of her country for the first time. We may confidently expect this one remark to be regurgitated ad nauseum from now to November, with the clear implication that Obama, associated with someone not only female and black, but manifestly un-American, is unfit to be President.

The effect of this non-stop surveillance is a process of relentless homogenization. Each candidate has certain niche constituencies they deliberately cultivate, which may have negative spinoffs with regard to other constituencies, but this is limited as much as possible, while potential negatives are frantically pared and sanded down by the teams of spin doctors and image makers to the ultimate extent possible.

The day after clinching the nomination, Obama was before AIPAC, the American-Israeli lobby, practically groveling to escape rumours of an anti-Israeli bias and in the process burning his bridges to a rational, unaligned Middle Eastern stance. To please AIPAC’s more-Zionist-than-the-Israelis hardliners, he even called into question the one issue with which he had rightly taken on both Clinton and McCain: daring to talk to Ahmadinejad, rather than threatening bombing and obliteration as opening diplomatic salvoes. It was a saddening spectacle for anyone with hopes that Obama might actually represent ‘change’ in America’s relations with the world. Perhaps in office, he will show more courage and independence, but the point is that the dynamics of the campaign force candidates into corners that they will later have to work their way out of, at the cost of being accused of ‘flip-flopping’ (apparently a dire sin) and of betraying the lobbies that cynically intimidated them into conformity during the election.

This process of homogenization and dilution is not only interminable, but staggeringly expensive. Already, even before the party conventions formally anoint the two candidates, the campaigns have cost four times as much as the entire presidential election of 2000 when George Bush unveiled what was then seen as a fund-raising machine non pareil. The figures now head toward $900 million, and by the time the November election is in the books, it may well be past $2 billion. Obama has opted out of the shambolic public funding arrangement, so as not to limit his astonishing ability to bury his opponent in money. Much has been made of Obama’s capacity to raise vast sums in small donations from individuals online, a process cited as a kind of financial grassroots democracy, but remarkable as this is, it should not hide the fact that he also benefits from a massive move by corporate America away from the now discredited and discreditable Bushites, apparently in as much bad odour in many Wall Street boardrooms as in Main Street coffee shops. The Obama campaign gets a pile of corporate money despite the Senator’s liberal voting record, just as John McCain’s campaign organization is thick with the very lobbyists he likes to pretend are targets of his ‘reforming’ zeal.

The show may be highly entertaining, but the production is very costly, and the bankrollers must have deep pockets. Just how much change and reform can anyone realistically expect to emerge at the other end of a machine that funnels in big bucks and funnels out sausages deliberately processed for inoffensive blandness?

Good news, bad news? Who knows? But we have to hand it to the Americans: no matter how much they have screwed up around the world, “it’s still the same old story, the fight for love and glory”, as the song played by Sam for the exiled Yank Bogart in Casablanca said.

There’s no business like show business.

June 20
Roundtable Reponse to "The Real Persian Puzzles"

Yesterday's Watching America put forth a series of considerations of political and economic developments in Iran. Responses soon came in from Lizzie Telfer and Chris Emery, both of the University of Birmingham, and Seyed Mohammad Marandi of the University of Tehran. My thanks to all of them --- SL]

EMERY:

TELFER: 

1) I would question whether Ali“Larijani [the Speaker of the Parliament] commands respect amongst a wide section of the Iranian political” elite. His depth of support in the Majles [the Iranian Parliament] is disputable. It is important to consider that when he won his landslide victory for the speakership on 28 May, Larijani was unopposed. His only rival, former Speaker Gholamhoseyn Haddad-Adel, had dropped out of the race.  Although he had clear backers in Qom, such ass the conservative Militant Clergy Association and the Qom Theological Seminary Association, their influence in the Majles is uncertain andboth have disavowed having backed him for the speakership. 

What makes Larijani unpopular among most reformists and even some conservatives in Iran is his utter devotion to Ayatollah Khamene’i. During Larijani’s 10-year tenure as head of the state television (IRIB), he allowed Hoseynian, now one of Larijani's strongest cheerleaders in the Majles, to blame the 1998 serial killings of dissidents on the reformists.  He permitted members of the security services to film political prisoners giving fabricated confessions, aired a fake political teaser to destroy Khatami's presidential bid, and selectively broadcast portions of a conference in Berlin which led to imprisonment of many Iranian intellectuals. The accusations resulted in Larijani being banned from attending cabinet meetings.  These defamation campaigns created a wide impression that Larijani was a puppet of the conservative camp. It is rumours of his disagreements with Ahmadinejad that are now reviving his reputation and his entirely-by-appointment political life.

Care should be taken before we label Larijani as either a moderating force or a main rival to Ahmadinejad, particularly as Iranian newspapers are still finding justification to peg him as an “ally” of the President.  It is important to bear in mind that Larijani has never explicitly addressed his differences with Ahmadinejad in public. The most prominent aspect of Iranian policy in the West is the nuclear issue; while Larijani is well-known for “vociferously attacking Ahmadinejad’s nuclear policies, this has been in private. 

It is this private talk which has endeared Larijani to western analysts and the western public who believe he must be more pragmatic and moderate than the current president.  However, I think we must avoid the tendency of reading one’s own opinion/views into the Iranian popular will.  Larijani assumed his role as chief of the negotiating team only after relentlessly criticizing then President Mohammad Khatami's policies on the nuclear issue. The novice diplomat earned three U.N. Security Council resolutions against Tehran in less than a year, leading him to depart his most unglamorous position in a short time amidst ill feelings.

2) Choosing Ayatollah Khamene’i as a barometer for assessing who has support and what implication that support has in the Iranian politics could be misleading.  Moreover, there have been suggestions that Ahmadinejad’s current campaign is with Khamenei’s blessing. 

3) Again, I think we should be careful about creating a simple Ahmadinejad/ Larijani divide. I doubt Larijani himself has much chance of being elected president.  Ahmadinejad will likely be opposed in the next election by credible candidates, possibly by Khatami if not Rafsanjani and by a few others.  Rafsanjani has enough power within the governing institutions and also among the reformist and conservatives to deal with this new wave under Ahmadinejad. Another prominent figure, Tabasi from Mashhad, is very powerful and definitely will react to him.  

Larijani appeared to join forces with Tehran mayor Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf in the leadup to the recent parliamentary election to challenge Ahmadinejad's faction. Qalibaf did much better than Larijani in 2005 (he won 14% of the vote) and has positioned himself ever since as Ahmadinejad's main challenger in 2009. If the Larijani-Qalibaf alliance holds (which is by no means guaranteed after the recent support to Larijani from the United Fundamentalist Front- a group allied to Ahmadinejad) and if Larijani uses his position as speaker to attack Ahmadinejad on behalf of Qalibaf, then they would pose a formidable challenge to Ahmadinejad. 

EMERY:

I particularly agree with Lizzie's point about Khameini's support being misleading- he has spent the last 20 years perfecting a strategy of tactically extending his blessing to several opposing individuals and groups- in short he likes to play people off each other. His blessing can be partial, superficial, even genuine --- but always tactical.

MARANDI:

Larijani does have quite a bit of support. The fact that not a single MP from any of the main factions voted against him is very revealing. All of the reformist MPs (from differing factions) voted for him as well.

I take issue with some of the charges against Larijani, such as the claims of fabricated confessions, "fake political teasers", and broadcasts of the Berlin conference leading to the imprisonment of people. It is true that Larijani was expelled from one cabinet meeting --- if I remember correctly, that was because IRIB aired a live interview with Mr. Hussainian about the serial killings of dissidents --- but President Khatami later went to see Larijani, to apologize.

As for current politics, I am not aware of any newspaper calling Larijani an ally of the president. His disagreements with the president are well documented. In fact, that is why he resigned. 

Any specific focus on Larijani wth respect to the nuclear issue should be treated with caution.  None of the main political players in Iran --- Rafsanjani, Larijani, Khatami, Ahmadinejad, Karrubi, and Ghalibaf --- believe that Iran should suspend the enrichment of uranium. 

Larijani, Ahmadinejad, Rohani, and Khatami have never determined Iran's nuclear policy. It has always been the Supreme National Security Council that has made the decisions with the approval of the leader. In fact, the restarting the nuclear program began during the last weeks of the Khatami preidency. However, Larijani has become popular among academics and many
others in Iran because of the way in which he forced the IAEA and Solana to accept
that 6 key questions about Iran's nuclear program have been resolved.

Regarding Ayatollah Khamenei: he is the most credible political figure in Iran and he has strong support among almost all of the major political groups in thecountry. As for the claims that he is backing Ahadinejd's campaign, he has always supported the president who is in office (Rafsanjani, Khatami, and Ahmadinejad). If he doesn't the government could
become very weak and even fall.

June 17
How to Fight Terrorists
Rami Khouri

[This essay by our colleague Rami Khouri is reprinted from Middle East Online. --- SL]

WASHINGTON - The 9/11 attack against the United States happened nearly seven years ago -- time enough, you would think, for the United States to come to grips with the causes and nature of terror. I am puzzled by how American society as a whole, with few exceptions, continues to react to the terror phenomenon with heated anger, rather than the cold analysis required to understand and defeat it.

Rami G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon.

June 13
Who is Making Tehran's Iraq Policy?
Farideh Farhi

[Farideh Farhi's analysis is reprinted from Juan Cole's Informed Comment website. --- SL]

I have to admit that I am quite mystified by the never-ending search for finding the one person that “really” makes policy in Iran. The latest example of this search can be found in David Ignatius’s Washington Post column in which we are informed that it is really not the “bombastic” Ahmadinejad but the “soft-spoken” commander of the Qods Force of Islamic Revolution’s Guard Corps (IRGC), Brigadier General Qassem Soleimani, “who plays a decisive role in his nation's confrontation with the United States.” Soleimani’s name has in fact been in the news for a while because of his reported role in brokering the cease-fire that restored calm in Basra in March.

Perhaps it is the history of the United States’ dealings with most Middle Eastern countries (Israel and Turkey excepted) and the tradition or habit of dealing with one man as the ultimate decision maker that creates the hope or aspiration to find the one person that holds the key to Iran’s policy making process. Or perhaps it is the tendency, when in doubt or short evidence, to go with the fad of the moment.

I understand that it is now in vogue to talk about the IRGC in general and the Qods Force as the THE power in Iran (with consequential impact throughout the Middle East). I have not found this argument to be very convincing. My take continues to be that the military in Iran has traditionally been and continues to be under civilian control, even if the Guards hierarchy as well as its individual members have and do play an important role in Iranian politics. The birth of the Islamic Republic was inextricably linked to the Iran-Iraq War and as such it should not be surprisingly to anyone that the body and individuals that played important roles in that war continue to be influential. Ironically, to my mind, the comparable country in this regard has always been Israel, another Middle Eastern political system born and bred in war.

In any case, even if there has been a rise in the power of hard-line IRGC men, I find the focus on one individual quite unpersuasive, particularly since the sources that have talked about Soleimani’s key role in Iran are all from outside of Iran (in the case of Ignatius' piece, the source is one “Arab who meets regularly with Soleimani”).

This is not to say that someone like Soleimani has no influence in Iran's decision making process. From what I understand, although I cannot be sure, Soleimani sits in the committee for regional affairs of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council-- consisting of him as well as the chief of intelligence of IRGC, the deputy foreign minister for Arab and African affairs (who also heads the Foreign Ministry's Iraq Desk), Mohammd Reza Baqer, a team of experts on Iranian-Arab relations and Iran's ambassadors to Arab countries (Hassan Kazemi-Qomi in the case of Iraq). Focusing in particular on developments in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and the occupied Palestinian territories, the task of this committee is to advise on the appropriate policies to be pursued. But the final decision makers are civilians (some well known because of their institutional positions and others like the head of supreme leader Khamenei's security office, the cleric Asghar Hejazi or his chief of staff Mohammad Golpayegani - also a cleric - wielding less publicized influence).

Furthermore, regarding Iran’s Iraq policy, I just can't believe that Soleimani wields more (or for that matter less) influence or has more input in the decision making process than let us say the current head of IRGC, Mohammad Ali (Aziz) Jaafari, who prior to his current position was in charge of setting up IRGC's Strategic Center, a center tasked with drawing up a new command structure and military strategy, preparing the country for the changing regional environment and the kind of foreign military confrontation it may have to face; or Iran’s Iraq ambassador Kazemi Qomi, reportedly himself a former Qods force member.

These key individuals and many others must be in constant interaction to set and reassess policies that are partially shaped by a long-term interest in a relatively calm Iraq that maintains close political, economic, and security relations with Iran and also developed in reaction to Iraq’s complex domestic dynamics and US plans for that country.

Within this context one does not need to search for a scheming and all powerful individual like Soleimani to figure out that the Iranian leadership as a whole, in all its contentious variety, would have to be engaged in constant conversation and planning (and at times improvisation) about how to stunt plans that would make the US military presence in Iraq permanent or make that country a launching pad for an attack on Iran (rejection of this possibility was by the way precisely the assurance Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was repeatedly giving Iranian leaders in his current visit to Tehran).

One also doesn’t have to be a genius to guess that, hunkered down in a security and paranoid mode due to the escalating economic and political pressures (not to mention military threats) faced in the past couple of years, the Iranian policy makers are trying very hard to convince the Bush Administration, from my point of view hopefully successfully, that an attack on Iran will be costly.

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June 10
Academic  Freedom: Update on the Hicham Yezza Deportation
Scott Lucas

Mr Yezza's case is still with Home Office legal advisors. Meanwhile, like many others, I raised my concern over the prosecution of the case with UK immigration authorities.

I received this reply on 6 June:

Dear Sir/Madam,

Thank you for your e-mail regarding ‘Hicham Yezza’.

Your support and comments have been received; unfortunately we are unable to discuss individual cases specifically as the UK Border Agency is bound by the Data Protection Act.

If you would like to add any further comments regarding this matter please address them in writing to:

UK Border Agency
Lunar House,
40 Wellesley Road,
Croydon,
Surrey,
CR9 2BY 

Yours Sincerely, 

UK Border Agency
Public Correspondence

Encouraged by this full and forthright response, I wrote:

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June 9
Readers Respond

On "Where's Ehud?" (Watching America, June 6)

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June 4
Academic  Freedom: Update on the Hicham Yezza Deportation

Hicham Yezza, the University of Nottingham administrator detained over the downloading of an Al-Qa'eda training manual from the website of the US Department of Justice, obtained a court order last Friday delaying his deportation to Algeria. Clips of  last Wednesday's demonstration at the University, which brought out more than 500 people in support of postgraduate Rizwaan Sabir and Mr Yezza and of the principle of academic freedom, are available on YouTube. Media attention, spurred by the demonstration, led to an interview with Mr Yezza in last Saturday's Guardian.

The battle is far from over, however. Mr Yezza has been been moved to his fifth detention centre, probably near Dover, in anticipation of his next deportation hearing on 16 July. A public meeting is scheduled for 6 p.m. tonight at the University, with speakers including former Guantanamo detainee Moazzam Begg, to discuss the issues and next steps.

We continue to be concerned that, if the British Government perceives a decline in attention to this case, it will move quickly ---- irrespective of legal or moral considerations --- to complete the removal of Mr Yezza to Algeria.

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June 3
Don't Expect a Big Change in US Foreign Policy
Timothy Lynch and Robert Singh, University of London

[Our thanks to the authors for permission to reprint this article from the Wall Street Journal's opinion pages of 2 June. A response has been posted on Watching America. --- SL]

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June 2
Turning a Corner with Tehran?
Germany's Place in the US-Europe-Iran Triangle
Colette Mazzucelli, Molloy College

The recent election of Ali Larijani, a rival to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, as speaker of the Iranian parliament sends a message that the West and the world must know how to read. ran’s present economic course has left a country flush with oil revenues reeling from inflation with blackouts last winter during which its people had neither heat nor electricity.  Given that the country’s growing youth population is dissatisfied with the state of the economy ahead of the summer 2009 elections, do parliamentary changes at the top foreshadow a different government in Tehran next year?

Mr Larijani, a pragmatist and the former lead Iranian negotiator in nuclear talks with the West,  resigned his post on Iran's National Security Council last October. His return to influence thorugh the Parliament is a striking development in the ever shifting balance among numerous competing power centers in Iran. Mr Larijani clearly has the support of the country’s supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, whose voice is decisive in policymaking.  His new role is likely to motivate the Iranian parliament to present a more effective challenge to Mr. Ahmadinejad’s unpopular decisions. 

His elevation as speaker is also significant because of its timing. It comes ahead of important elections in Europe, including the German federal elections, as well as the US Presidential and Congressional  elections. The official view from Washington is that Mr. Larijani’s rise is a continuation of the present regime with which the Bush administration refuses to negotiate unless preconditions are met. In the run-up to the November elections, however there are calls from experienced policymakers, including Zbigniew Brzezinski and General William Odom, for the United States to adopt a ‘dramatically different diplomatic approach’ whose objective, in their analysis, is to ‘help bring Iran back into its traditional role of strategic cooperation with the United States in stabilizing the Gulf region’. For a country like Germany, this offers  opportunities, amidst its evolving relations with Medvedev’s Russia evolve, to be instrumental in the Iranian predicament. Berlin can manoeuvre with a new administration in Washington, between its E3 partners, France and Britain, and with negotiations among the 27 members of the European Union.

Redefining the Triangle - Balancing Moscow and Engaging Washington

The very public transatlantic rift over the Iraq war led Germany, France, and Russia to oppose the military actions of the United States and Great Britain. The present context in the Middle East gives the Merkel government a chance to redefine the German-American-Russian triangle in a different configuration.

The logistics of a phased withdrawal from Iraq are likely to emerge amidst the reality that the United States must work diligently to retain a presence for reconstruction, not occupation, over a prolonged time period. Meanwhile, the Bush Administration has repeatedly called for Germany and other large European states to increase their involvement in Afghanistan. To date, the Merkel government has not agreed to increase Germany’s military contribution, even though at the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, France and Romania demonstrated solidarity with Washington with an agreement to provide increased commitments of soldiers.

These issues of co-operation with Washington intersect with the Iranian question. As the Merkel government faces the challenges of Russia’s opposition to the transatlantic agreement on missile defense, the Federal Republic continues to negotiate constructively in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to keep Russia and China on board in negotiations with the Islamic Republic. It can do so with some signs of pressure upon Iran, given that a third round of sanctions against Iran was agreed to, without dissent, earlier this year and that the recent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report, which Mr. Larijani has criticized, has raised concerns about a new generation of centrifuges the Iranians are developing at the uranium enrichment plant in Natanz.

The window of opportunity over the next year is for Germany to strengthen its relations with the new Russian president in a way that retains his constructive support for multilateral diplomacy on Iran. Russian leaders are likely to accompany the European Union’s High Representative Mr. Javier Solana, as well as their German, French, British, and Chinese counterparts, in an upcoming meeting to induce the Iranians to accept a package of enhanced incentives to suspend its uranium enrichment program.

American leaders do not intend to participate in the meeting, however. Thus the strategic opportunity emerges, as the German government develops relationships with the next administration, for Berlin to encourage direct US diplomatic engagement with Iran at the level of a special envoy who has the confidence of the new president.

Dual Tracks on Iran – German Interests in the E3 and EU

Germany has the chance to pursue a dual track within European circles to address the Iranian predicament. The E3 track is now firmly embedded within the E3 + 3 discussions at the United Nations, but as Germany is the only non-nuclear member of the E3, its diplomacy can demonstrate a renewed commitment to the principles of the Nonproliferation Treaty regime. Highlighting the threat to the planet that proliferation represents, Germany can stake out a position of both moral necessity and the prudence of realist policys.

Thus Germany finds itself in a critical position, given that the electoral contexts in Berlin and Tehran are likely to be fluid during the coming year.Berlin must work with Vienna, Paris, the smaller members, and Brussels institutions in a European concert grounded in precedents for imposing sanctions based on human rights. At stake is more than a demonstration of the Union’s normative influence as an alternative leadership model for the 21^st century. Their objective is to construct a solid multilateral coalition around the imposition of EU sanctions against Iran on the basis of universal human rights violations. The Merkel government has the chance to make a difference in relations between the Iranian regime and its population by matching actions and convictions in the ‘nation-European’ interest. This is an ethical imperative to prevent the weapons proliferation that will surely lead to increased regional impoverishment as well as greater incentives for world powers to perpetuate the global arms trade, thereby sustaining a race to acquire nuclear weapons in the Middle East.

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May 29
Report on the Nottingham Demonstrations
for Rizwaan Sabir and Hicham Yezza
Maria Ryan, University of Nottingham

When I spoke two days ago to Dr. Bettina Renz (School of Politics & IR and Rizwaan Sabir's personal tutor), we were worried that if there were just a few of us a the demo we might get arrested for reading out the Al Qaeda handbook. We needn't have worried: there were hundreds of us, from first year undergrads to senior professors. There were banners everywhere and (not to be taken too literally of course) orange jumpsuits, including one worn by me with 'Lecturer' written on the back. Several members of academic staff read from the Al Qaeda handbook, followed by a student.

Our local MP, Alan Simpson (Labour) came to support and received loud cheers for a cracking speech in which he was scathingly critical of the University (for lacking common sense), of the Police ("what a cock-up" they had made) and the government (for passing such draconian counter-terror laws that endanger the freedoms they are supposed to be protecting in the 'war on terror'). He gave full support to Hicham Yezza and made it clear that he thinks the 'visa irregularities' under which Hicham is now being held are trumped up political charges and called for the Home Secretary to intervene personally in this case. We marched around the campus in the pouring (really pouring) rain into the courtyard of the Trent Building, where the VC's office is. Then hundreds of people stood in complete silence for several minutes facing the VC's office, holding up banners, some with masking tape over their mouths. I have to say, the silence was very powerful. Very dignified. You could hear a pin drop. There were many people waving posters out of windows in support. After several minutes we continued out through the other side of the Trent court yard. The organisers managed to get Hicham on the phone and everyone gave him a big, big cheer. He sent a message thanking everyone for everything and asking them to continue the campaign.

Overall a big success, I think. Latest news is that the VC has now written to the Home Secretary about Hicham. We're continuing to write to MPs and urging everyone else to do the same. If anyone wants to, they would need the following details:

Name: Hicham Yezza; Home Office Reference Number: Y76064; held at Colnbrook Removal Centre; due for deportation to Algeria on Sunday.

Anyone with an opinion to express on this issue can contact Nottingham University at registrars@nottingham.ac.uk

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May 28
Reaction in Nottingham to the Student ‘Terror’ Arrests
Maria Ryan, University of Nottingham *

This Wednesday at 2pm staff and students at the University of Nottingham will hold a protest outside the main library in which members of academic staff will read out sections of the Al Qaeda handbook. This will be followed by a silent march to the Vice-Chancellor’s office to present him with petitions from both students and staff protesting at the University’s failure to support Rizwaan Sabir, a post-graduate student, and Hicham Yezza, a former student and current employee of the University, after their arrest under the Prevention of Terrorism Act two weeks ago.

The arrests have hit a nerve with academics here at Nottingham and, indeed, across the country. There is much to be concerned about: the criminalisation under any circumstances of possession of material that may be used for legitimate research purposes; the consequences of this for academic freedom; the extreme overreaction of the Police to Rizwaan’s downloading of this material (vital for his MA dissertation); their lack of awareness of the purpose of post-graduate research; the shameful failure of the University authorities to support freedom of research for its students and scholars; and finally, the imminent deportation of our colleague, Hicham Yezza, to Algeria due to alleged ‘visa irregularities’ (the details of which have yet to be revealed by Police).

Rizwaan is a passionate and extremely hardworking student who is a candidate for an MA in International Politics at Nottingham and will be writing a dissertation about Islamic extremism this summer. As all former post-graduate students will recall, the financial challenges of post-grad study can be as great as writing dissertations and theses themselves. After realising that the Al Qaeda handbook was 1,500 pages long, Rizwaan asked his friend Hicham (a member of staff—therefore allowed to print for free) to run the document off for him. Much like the collected speeches and statements of Osama Bin Laden, the handbook is a propaganda spiel against infidels and the West. Rizwaan confirmed today that it was, in fact, downloaded from the web site of the US Department of Justice , not the RAND organisation as previously thought. (An edited version is also available to purchase from Amazon.co.uk . There can be no doubt that this information is in the public domain. Yet in Rizwaan and Hicham’s case, downloading it resulted in arrest. In Rizwaan’s case (the one with which I am more familiar) his family home was raided, he was kept in isolation for six days and his family were forced to leave their home for several days.

The problem is that the law, as it stands, prohibits mere possession of material that is deemed by the Police to incite violence. But who decides whether something incites violence and under what criteria? What about those who acquire material for legitimate research purposes and material that is already in the public domain? How can researchers know which sources are allowed and which might be deemed unacceptable—especially given the wide public availability of the Al Qaeda handbook and other similar material on perfectly legal and legitimate web sites, including sites run by the US government. There are, at present, no exceptions in the Terrorism Act for genuine researchers. Possession of material deemed by the Police to incite violence is illegal under any circumstances. Thankfully, in Rizwaan’s case, common sense has prevailed and the law has been interpreted in spirit rather than to the letter; it is not in the public interest to prosecute those with no malign intent. But until there is a change in the law, such cases could reoccur. However, the issue goes beyond academic freedom: this implies two tiers to freedom of enquiry. What about the interested lay person, who wants to do more to understand the world around them? Shouldn’t such individuals also be free to read open source material that is in the public domain?

After my encounters with counter-terrorist police, I cannot say that I feel confident in their ability to investigate such cases in a well informed manner. Although the detectives I spoke to were counter-terrorism specialists, they were completely unaware of the nature of post-graduate research—that it should result in an original contribution to knowledge, that it would require searching for new sources of information. Neither did they realise that a web site ending in ‘.ac.uk’ is an official UK university web site. (Rizwaan had consulted the St Andrew’s site as the University has a useful archive of material online as part of its centre for terrorism studies.) They also seemed unaware that criticism of US foreign policy is widespread within the academy. Such a lack of awareness does not bode well given the extremely wide-ranging nature of the powers the police now have to arrest without charge. In this case, all that was required was a discreet chat with Rizwaan’s MA supervisor and members of staff who have worked with him. Instead, the Police had licence to raid the homes of both Rizwaan and Hicham and keep them both in solitary confinement for almost a week.

What has dismayed many of the students and staff here is the University’s complicity in the two arrests, for it was the University that informed the Police of Rizwaan and Hicham’s downloading of the document. There are numerous academics in the School of Politics & International Relations who research terrorism and download similar material without consequence. What made the University decide to tell the police about Rizwaan and Hicham, rather than simply check up on the situation with Rizwaan’s tutors? Instead of supporting academic freedom, a University spokesman told the Times Higher Education that the document was “not legitimate research material”—thus implicitly arguing that some areas of research should be off-limits. Stung by criticism, the University back-tracked and claimed that although registered students had “very good cause” to access material they required, they should not “send it on to any Tom, Dick or Harry”. But as Rizwaan commented today, if material is in the public domain, then it is there to be read by any Tom, Dick or Harry. The petition that will be handed to the Vice Chancellor calls on the University to acknowledge its lack of support for a legitimate post-grad researcher.

It also calls on the University to support Hicham Yezza, to whom our thoughts have now turned. After being released without charge, Hicham—a native of Algeria —was immediately re-arrested on alleged ‘visa irregularities’. That these charges have followed so hot on the heels of the previous allegations is worrying, especially since the Police have not released any information about the allegations against him. Hicham has lived in the UK for the last thirteen years as a law abiding and hard working resident. He is a former doctoral student at the University of Nottingham , where he now works in a non-academic capacity. He has been taken to Colnbrook removal centre and faces imminent deportation to Algeria . At Wednesday’s demonstration, we will also call upon Hicham’s employers—the University—to support his case.

Anyone wishing to register concern about the University’s conduct may do so by writing to registrars@nottingham.ac.uk

* The views expressed in this article are personal and do not represent the views of the University of Nottingham .

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May 14
The Presidential Campaign: What Next for the Democrats? 

[As part of Libertas' ongoing coverage of the US Presidential election, here's the latest inside discussion between David Dunn of Birmingham, Adam Quinn of Leicester, and Mark McClelland of Birmingham on the Democratic primaries. --- SL]

David Dunn: I think this captures the tragic destruction of the Clinton legacy very
well.

Hillary Clinton's suicidal gamble with race poison

Adam Quinn: Those whom the gods wish to destroy they first make mad.

Interesting to have a look at the VP contenders in the adjoining article. I suspect Obama will pick either [Bill] Richardson (reward for early endorsement/Hispanic/Western state/experienced), or A. Woman (because he feels he needs a big gesture to Hillary's disgruntled base). Obviously, he'd be insane to pick Clinton, and I hope he resists any pressure to do it. She has a perfectly good career as a distrusted backbench Senator stretching out ahead of her, and no one should keep her from it.

Personally, I think Jim Webb [Senator from Virginia] would be a good pick. He'd shore up support with a certain type of floating voter, and could take the lead out of McCain's militarist pencil if the campaign turns to national security.

David Dunn: Agreed, Clinton is best avoided for the VP slot and the more she damages
herself the less she needs to be accommodated. Whether she would take it is another matter too, having been VP already to Bill.  Best to give her the health portfolio instead, let her mess it up a second time and and keep her off his back.

Interesting how the debate has now moved to the VP slot. Richardson has too many smoking bimbos to be a serious contender so my money would be on any serious white Woman who is not Hilary.

Mark McClelland: I concur with all the remarks re Clinton for Veep. Also agree with Adam that Obama needs to pick a moderate with a bit of military bite --- yes, Webb would be an excellent choice, especially due to being Secretary of the Navy under Reagan (stop all those Reagan Democrats jumping to McCain).

Although he's been in the Senate less than two years, perhaps someone like Webb would have been a better candidate for President than Obama. This year should really have been a cakewalk for the Democrats to reclaim the White House. Instead one of the two leading candidates is, by some measurements, the most left-wing member of the Senate, and the other is instantly despised by many due to her surname. The GOP in general is performing absolutely catastrophically in the polls (even Senator Elizabeth Dole looks in trouble in North Carolina, of all places!), but the polls out of Minnesota and Michigan yesterday, for example, continue to show that Obama is going to have real trouble hanging on to 'safe' rustbelt Democratic territory against McCain. As a bit of context, Minnesota hasn't voted Republican in a general election since Nixon. This seems less to do with race, and more about Obama seeming to be an effete liberal, "Bittergate", etc.

While the GOP have played a very weak hand well by plumping for McCain, it may well transpire come November that the Dems have done the opposite with picking Obama. We may well end up with massive landslides for the Democrats in the House and Senate but still see them falling short of the White House.

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May 12
Four Days That Transformed the Middle East

Rami Khouri from Beirut

[Our friend and colleague Rami Khouri has just published this exemplary analysis of the last 96 hours in the Lebanon. His projection of what may now happen is incisive, provocative, and --- in the circumstances --- surprisingly hopeful. Thanks to Rami and Agence Global for allowing us to reprint this essay. --- SL]

Events in Beirut and other parts of Lebanon continue to move erratically, with simultaneous gestures of political compromise and armed clashes that have left more than 20 killed in the past week. The consequences of what has happened in the past week may portend an extraordinary but constructive new development: the possible emergence of the first American-Iranian joint political governance system in the Arab World. Maybe.

If Lebanon shifts from street clashes to the hoped-for political compromise through a renewed national dialogue process, it will have a national unity government whose two factions receive arms, training, funds and political support from both the United States and Iran. Should this happen, an unspoken American-Iranian political condominium in Lebanon could prove to be key to power-sharing and stability in other parts of the region, such as Palestine, Iraq and other hot 
spots. This would also mark a huge defeat for the United States and its failed diplomatic approach that seeks to confront, battle and crush the Islamist-nationalists throughout the region.

The brief, isolated, but intense clashes that occurred in the four days between Wednesday and Sunday threatened a total, Iraq-like collapse of Lebanon, with the Hizbullah-led alliance controlling power in the capital Beirut and other critical areas. The frantic pace of political and street action comprised and clarified four noteworthy developments, whose implications for the rest of the Middle East could be momentous:

1. When the government decided to challenge Hizbullah Tuesday by announcing it was sacking the Shiite army general in charge of airport security and dismantling Hizbullah's underground security telecommunications network, Hizbullah saw this as the first serious attempt by the government to try and disarm it. Hizbullah immediately challenged the government, warned it against these decisions, and made a show of force to protect its security and telecommunications system. When street clashes started in several parts of Beirut, the Iranian- and Syrian-backed Hizbullah-led opposition alliance quickly and roundly asserted its dominance over the US- and Saudi-backed government alliance. Put to the test, the new balance of power in Lebanon affirmed itself on the street for the first time in less than 24 hours.

2. All the Lebanese parties repeatedly indicated a preference for political compromise over communal war, but also showed they were prepared to fight if forced to. The persistent negotiations via the mass media included critical agreements on naming armed forces 
commander Michael Suleiman as the new president, resuming the national dialogue, forming a government of national unity, and revising the electoral law before holding parliamentary elections next year. Negotiating offers came in sequence from Hizbullah secretary-general and Shiite leader Hassan Nasrallah, Future Movement head and Sunni leader Saad Hariri, Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, and the Shiite Amal movement of Hizbullah ally Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri.

3. The newly vulnerable government effectively backed down Saturday and reversed its two decisions, as Hizbullah had demanded. The street balance of power was translated into a new political equation inside Lebanon. Hizbullah and its allies had achieved on the street that 
which they had been asking for politically: the capacity to veto government decisions that were seen as threatening Hizbullah's security and resistance activities.

4. By immediately handing over to the armed forces those few buildings and strategic locations that they had taken over in Beirut, Hizbullah and its allies sent the signal that they did not want to rule the entire country, and that they trusted the army as a neutral arbiter between the warring Lebanese factions. Prime Minister Siniora sent the same message when he asked the armed forces and their commander Michele Suleiman to decide on the fate of the two contested government security decisions that had sparked Hizbullah?s move into West Beirut. The armed forces emerged as the powerful political arbiter and peace-keeper, effectively forming a fourth branch of government, and the only one that is credible and effective in the 
eyes of the entire population.

All factions have agreed to get armed gunmen off the streets and leave only the army and police as public security guardians. Now they are expected to follow up quickly by formally naming Suleiman as president (to which they have all agreed already), agreeing on a transitional national unity government of technocrats, and drawing up a new election law. The precise sequence of those events is one of the disputed points that must be agreed, but agreement may be easier now that the army has emerged as a pivotal arbiter and political actor.

The new domestic political balance of power in Lebanon will reflect millennia-old indigenous Middle Eastern traditions of different and often quarreling parties that live together peacefully after negotiating power relationships, rather than one party totally defeating and humiliating the other. Lebanon can only exist as a single country if its multi-ethnic and multi-religious population shares power. As the political leaders now seek to do this, they operate in a new context where the strongest group comprises Iranian- and Syrian-backed Islamist Shiites and their junior partner Christian and Sunni Muslim Lebanese allies. They will share power in a national unity government with fellow Lebanese who are friends, allies, dependents and proxies of the United States and Saudi Arabia.   

If a new Middle East truly is being born, this may well prove to be its nursery.

@2008 Rami G. Khouri/Agence Global

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May 8
Another Campaign Update

Chris Emery from Virginia

Yea, Hillary is gone now. She needed to keep it much tighter in North Carolina and win Indiana more convincingly. Tax gimmick didn't work. Plus she is broke- having to lend your own campaign $6 million plus is pretty desperate. To be fair, I said Obama had to learn from PA- and he did. He dealt with the negative stuff (Rev. Wright) brilliantly and connected better with those outside his normal demographics. I think the super-delegates most of all needed convincing that he could learn from PA and they are broadly satisfied that he has. He needs to keep on this track. He will lose W Virginia and Kentucky- but no matter.

Next big question: the running mate. I'd go for Richardson- pick up some of those Hispanics that he has trouble attracting.

I think his camp should still be worried by the number of Hillary supporters who refuse to vote for him vs McCain. It still worried me, I have to say. Karl Rove was making a lot of this on fox. That said, McCain performed badly when I watched him talk and take questions on CNN. The Dems have a very effective TV add on the moment- which has him quoting 'I have no problem with US troops being in Iraq for 50, even 100 years'- repeated for effect. Even if he can talk his way out of that one- him admitting not being an expert on economics could be costly.

Incidentally, I keep hearing some seriously tragic stories about health insurance. One guy at the fencing club downtown was literally almost in tears explaining how everyday he wakes up with the fear that he would have to sell his house if his kids/wife got sick. Another had a car wreck a few years back and is totally crippled (no pun intended) by credit card debt and had his car repossessed. I don't see how Hillary's plan of making it illegal to be uninsured would help...

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April 24
Campaign Update

John Matlin on Electoral Math

  So, Hillary won Pennsylvania and the talking heads found more fuel to keep the Democratic candidates at the top of the news cycle. There are another ten primaries remaining to be decided and twelve million plus registered Democratic voters who may state their preference before the primary season runs its course. Yet camp spokespersons, who seem to feel that the November national election is put in jeopardy for the Democrats by continued fighting, suggest that Hillary should move aside or that Obama has lost ground irrevocably because he cannot “nail” his opponent. Newspapers criticise Hillary for her “attack tactics” and Obama for past “offences”, some when he was very young.

What some Americans do not want to accept is that they are witnessing democracy, American style. America elected Lincoln in 1860 with 40% of the vote and used sleight of hand in 1876 so that Hayes, aka His Fraudulence, took the White House. The country has come a long way. Everything is out in the open now. Clinton and Obama are taking huge lumps out of each other in the public gaze. The American public is getting a real contest with policy differences being aired and tested.

However, there is a fly in the ointment, namely the super delegates. Whatever happens in the remaining primaries, it is highly probable that neither Democratic candidate will win sufficient delegates to take the nomination. Therefore, the super delegates will decide the outcome, not the voters in the primaries. Two factors will be uppermost in the minds of super delegates. Uncharitable as it may be to say so, the first will be “interest”, or “what is in it for me?” Who knows what pork will be squeezed into the barrel for these delegates? Neither candidate can offer jobs in exchange for votes. This form of patronage is now a federal crime. However, nods and winks are hard to prove.

 Assuming that both super delegates and candidates are above “interest”, the outcome of the democratic contest will surely be decided on electoral math. There may well be “swing states” but all it takes to win the White House is for a candidate to take the eleven most populated states. The Electoral College, faithless electors excepted, will award the presidency to that candidate. Surely the super delegates will be guided by which of Clinton or Obama is best placed to succeed in states such as California , New York , Texas , Ohio , Michigan and the like. On current evidence, unlikely as it may seem, Mrs Clinton will get the nod.

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Chris Emery with the view from the US

I watched both HC and BO speeches live last night. Both were impressive, but Hillary's was easily her best yet and out trumped Obama in the inspiring rhetoric stakes. She also appealed directly for more money- and got it..$2.5 million in the next 3hrs after her speech. The commentary here is that Hillary is basically in general election mode and Obama isn't. That said, Obama talked much more about McCain than Hillary last night. Another general perception is that Obama will have to take lessons away from PA and engage more with blue collar voters and possibly go more negative.

The issue of negativity looks towards November- the basic reasoning being that if people criticise Hillary for being negative, they should wait and see what Obama would face from the Republican machine in Nov.

You are totally spot on about Clinton pitching to the super-delegates- I think it may actually be working. Her basic line is that, his college kids, blacks and educated middle classes are much more likely to vote Democrat regardless. The Latinos (a huge constituency that the super delegates will have to take account of), the blue collar workers and the oldies will be much more likely to vote McCain if faced with Obama. I think that the dems election is not about the policies (there is little difference) it's about power bases. To be fair, are the super-delegates really going to elect someone with such poor support amongst low income whites in key states such as Ohio and PA? Especially considering Hillary has the only realistic chance of taking Florida.

I think that if Hillary wins Indiana and cuts NC to less than 10 she will making a huge case to the super-delegates. She will have more money to spend in these states now.

The issue of money: commentators have argued that Hillary is keeping going despite Obama outspending her 2 or 3 to 1 and apparently having the support of the media. That's making people nervous. The guns and god issue may seem trivial to us- but it is HUGE in the right wing media at the moment. Even more trivial, though also continually mentioned, is his lack of a US flag pin badge- ridiculous, I know.

In short, I think Obama is the best candidate- but I'm just not sure he will be the next president. All I can say is that thank god something other than the pope or polygamous sects are on tv. The pope was literally wall to wall. Carter was universally slated for his recent ME trip as well (even by Obama, who has otherwise said encouraging things about engaging with 'enemies' such as Iran)

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Canuckistan Responds

Conversely, Canuckistan offers this shrewd post-Pennsylvania analysis, which is far from cheerful for Hillary Clinton:

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April 18
Readers Respond

April 16
The Obama "Working Class" Furour: A Reply
Steve Hewitt, University of Birmingham

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April 15
Will Mud Stick? The Obama "Working Class" Furour